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ARTICLES 
COURTS, CONSTITUENCIES, AND THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR 
Joseph Mead* & Michael Pollack** 
ABSTRACT 
Directors of nonprofit organizations owe fiduciary duties to their 
organizations, but the content of these duties—and how and when courts should 
enforce these duties—has long been debated among scholars and courts. This 
debate emerges in several areas, including the level of deference to be shown by 
courts to nonprofit directors (the business judgment rule), who should be allowed 
to sue to enforce duties (standing), and the type of relief available to prevailing 
plaintiffs (remedies). Existing literature explores these legal rules in isolation and 
in abstraction, generally failing to consider how the rules interact with each other 
and ignoring the empirical reality of the nonprofit sector. 
Because for-profit and nonprofit corporations evolved from a common 
ancestor, courts generally apply corporation law principles developed in the 
context of for-profit corporations to nonprofit corporations as well. But for-profit 
and nonprofit corporations often differ in key ways, including sources of income, 
constituencies, and other institutional characteristics. These differences make rote 
application of corporate law principles to nonprofit corporations a conceptually 
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questionable endeavor. Rather than setting nonprofit rules through strained 
analogies to for-profit concepts of ownership and profit-maximization, we propose 
employing an analysis of institutional features that can operate in a whole range of 
governance contexts, including the nonprofit sector. This approach considers 
opportunities for voice and exit, impact range, homogeneity, and comparative 
competence between boards and courts, and it does so among different types of 
nonprofit actors, like directors, members, employees, donors, customers, and 
beneficiaries. 
Using this institutional analysis with for-profit corporation law as the 
baseline, we compare emerging legal rules in the nonprofit sector against existing 
empirical literature. We find that, with one exception, institutional characteristics 
vis-à-vis nonprofit actors are reasonably comparable to their for-profit 
counterparts, and we therefore place the applicable legal regime with respect to 
those actors on a more conceptually sound footing. However, beneficiaries of a 
nonprofit organization tend to lack opportunities for exit or voice, face risk of 
considerable deprivation, and often differ considerably in relevant aspects from the 
individuals who manage the organization. We argue that the law should take into 
account the limited power of beneficiaries in nonprofit governance structures, and 
we analyze options for reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nearly every American interacts with a nonprofit organization over the course 
of each year, perhaps as a customer of a nonprofit hospital or school, a donor to a 
charitable or political cause, or an attendee of a religious, social, or cultural event. 
Nonprofits employ 10% of the nation’s labor force—not counting a jaw-dropping 
fifteen billion hours of volunteer labor each year—and manage trillions of dollars 
of assets.1 
Despite the sector’s size and importance, the study and development of 
nonprofit law has historically languished behind that of the business and 
government spheres. Indeed, nonprofits have been called “corporate ‘Cinderellas,’” 
the “‘neglected stepchildren of modern organization laws,’ relegated to the hand-
me-downs of their half-siblings, for-profit business organizations.”2 Most of the 
two million nonprofit organizations in the country are incorporated under state 
law,3 and state nonprofit corporation laws typically mirror for-profit counterparts 
with little more than an occasional word substitution.4 The similarities in legal 
treatment are particularly stark when it comes to the fiduciary duties of the 
governing board of directors,5 but at the same time, as a descriptive matter, 
nonprofit organizations are quite different than for-profits. For example, they are 
centered on missions other than profit, they lack owners, and they often rely on 
different revenue streams.6 Given these differences, and more, do the hand-me-
downs of corporate law fit the nonprofit form? 
This question is of central importance, for while legal scholars are 
increasingly recognizing and studying the nonprofit as a distinct organizational 
form, with a few important exceptions,7 the study of the law of nonprofit 
                                                          
 
1 Nonprofit Almanac, URB. INST., http://www.urban.org/books/nonprofit-almanac-2012/index.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
2 Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, 
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. LAW 631, 638 (1998). 
3 URBAN INST., Nonprofit Sector in Brief, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413277-
Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief-2014.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
4 Lizabeth Moody, The Who, What, and How of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 16 N. 
KY. L. REV. 251, 270 (1989). 
5 See infra Part II. 
6 See infra Part III. 
7 See generally MARION R. FREEMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL 
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION (2004); Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic 
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governance has largely been limited to discrete issues, such as the role of donors in 
enforcing director fiduciary duties,8 the application of Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired 
reforms to nonprofit boards,9 or the standard by which conflicts of interest should 
be judged.10 We build and expand on this prior scholarship by taking a more 
comprehensive account of the various facets of the nonprofit board’s fiduciary 
obligations and of the judicial enforcement of those obligations—including issues 
of standing, the business judgment rule, other forms of deference, and the tricky 
question of remedies. We do so by testing the fundamental assumption, which 
recurs in the literature, the law, and in recent law reform projects by the American 
Law Institute (“ALI”)11 and the American Bar Association (“ABA”),12 that for-
profit corporate law is an appropriate baseline for the legal treatment of nonprofit 
organizations. 
As we discuss, the assumption of nonprofit and for-profit equivalency is 
predominately based on historical accident, rather than on a systematic analysis of 
the different organizational forms.13 Of course, that does not necessarily doom the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (1996) 
[hereinafter Brody, Agents Without Principals]; Goldschmid, supra note 2, at 638; Henry B. Hansmann, 
Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa 
Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit 
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347 (2012). Law reform projects have also taken a 
comprehensive view. See Evelyn Brody, U.S. Nonprofit Law Reform: The Role of Private 
Organizations, 41 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 535–59 (2012) [hereinafter Brody, U.S. 
Nonprofit Law Reform]. 
8 See generally Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable 
Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655 (1998); Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable 
Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37 (1993); Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The 
Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183 (2007); Joshua B. Nix, The Things 
People Do When No One Is Looking: An Argument for the Expansion of Standing in the Charitable 
Sector, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 147 (2005). 
9 Joseph Mead, Note, Confidence in the Nonprofit Sector Through Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Reforms, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 881, 886 (2008). 
10 Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 
135–40 (1993); Goldschmid, supra note 2, at 648–49. 
11 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 3–4 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2007) [hereinafter ALI (Draft No. 1)]; Brody, U.S. Nonprofit Law Reform, supra note 7, at 545. We 
sometimes refer to this ALI project as “the Restatement.” 
12 See generally REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (2008) [hereinafter RMNCA], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/real_property_trust_estate/joint_fall/2008/black_let
ter.authcheckdam.pdf. 
13 See infra Part II.A. 
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idea, as even an assumption reached by accident can turn out to be right. However, 
it does demonstrate the need for a careful study that either lends credence to that 
assumption and to the legal regime that is premised on it, or reveals its flaws. This 
Article draws on and applies an approach designed to do just that.14 Specifically, 
we explore a set of mechanisms of accountability that inhere within the institutions 
themselves—mechanisms like voice and the ability to exit, the relative expertise of 
boards versus courts, the type of impact the organization has with respect to its 
constituents, and the competing interests within the institution.15 These 
characteristics are the locus of our examination because they substantially inform 
the nature and degree of judicial review that may be warranted with respect to the 
institution’s decision-making. 
Our analysis of these characteristics, performed from the perspective of 
various constituents of the nonprofit corporation, indicates that, for the most part 
and with respect to most constituents, nonprofits are actually quite comparable to 
for-profit entities across these relevant institutional dimensions. Therefore, we 
conclude that the prevailing trend of judicial review is not only appropriate, but far 
more defensible than the bare assumption of equivalency has suggested. By placing 
this particular doctrine on firmer conceptual footing, we also demonstrate the utility 
of the internal-accountability model to not only critique the status quo, but to shore 
it up as well. However, there is one exception to this finding, and it is a relatively 
important one: beneficiaries of nonprofits—those who receive the benefit of the 
nonprofit’s service without contributing the full cost—are limited in the access they 
have to institutional mechanisms of accountability, even though they face the 
specter of tremendous loss when nonprofit directors lose their way. The fact that 
the legal regime likewise deprives them of means of accountability thus leaves a 
significant gap that warrants further consideration. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we introduce the nonprofit 
sector and the types of characters who give these institutions life. In Part II, we 
examine the status quo of nonprofit fiduciary law, tracing the history of its 
development and surveying the different approaches adopted by different 
jurisdictions and recent law reform proposals to issues of standing, deference, and 
remedies. In Part III, we apply our institutional model for evaluating the nonprofit 
legal regime. 
                                                          
 
14 Michael C. Pollack, Judicial Deference and Institutional Character: Homeowners Associations and 
the Puzzle of Private Governance, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 846–57 (2013). 
15 Id. at 857–68. 
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Our discussion provides a fresh look at a sector that is increasingly faced with 
an identity crisis, as it sees its boundaries with for-profits blurred by mission-
oriented businesses, low-profit limited liability corporations (“L3Cs”), and benefit 
corporations (“BCorps”).16 This Article also fits into a broader literature about the 
accountability of institutions and the relationship between the state and civil 
society.17 Accountability is a notoriously “squishy” concept,18 but so, too, is the 
rhetoric that the managers of the nonprofit sector should be exempt from 
governance mandates based on ill-defined notions of pluralism or sectoral 
independence.19 The institutional model applied here provides a measure of 
analytical rigor to these conversations through the lens of the substance and nature 
of fiduciary oversight in the nonprofit sector. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Defining Nonprofit Organizations 
The nonprofit sector is vast and diverse. Numbering more than two million in 
the United States,20 nonprofits range from the tiny organization without a 
storefront, webpage, or paid staff member, to the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan 
with its annual budget of $41 billion21––an outlay larger than that spent by most 
states.22 This inclusive category simultaneously encompasses the corner soup 
                                                          
 
16 See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 619 (2010); John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having Two Masters: A Framework for 
L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117 (2010). 
17 See generally Alnoor Ebrahim, Making Sense of Accountability: Conceptual Perspectives for 
Northern and Southern Nonprofits, 14 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 191 (2003). 
18 Id. at 193; Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of 
“Multiple Accountabilities Disorder,” 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 94, 94 (2005). 
19 James J. Fishman, The Nonprofit Sector: Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 303, 306 (2006). 
20 Amy S. Blackwood et al., The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Public Charities, Giving, and Volunteering, 
URB. INST. 1 (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-
in-Brief.pdf. 
21 NCCS—Display Largest Public Charities, URB. INST., http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/showTop 
Orgs.php?cat=ALL&amt=exps (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
22 NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 4–6 (2013), available at 
https://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/NASBO%20Fall%202013%20Fiscal%20Survey%20of%20Sta
tes_0.pdf. 
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kitchen and the National Football League, as well as the local humane society and 
Harvard University.23 
While the diversity of the nonprofit sector makes generalities about nonprofit 
organizations tough to come by, they do exist.24 As a legal form, nonprofit 
corporations are predominantly creatures of state law.25 Although the nuances of 
the law vary among jurisdictions, the common thread is the nondistribution 
constraint:26 profits from the organization cannot be distributed to owners, but must 
be reinvested to further the organization’s mission.27 These limits bind both the 
large health plan and the tiny start-up, and distinguish both from their for-profit 
counterparts, where private benefit of owners is both lawful and expected.28 
Although state corporate laws give nonprofits life and set the ground rules for 
their governance, federal tax laws complement these rules by providing tax benefits 
to qualified nonprofit organizations that meet specific criteria.29 One of the most 
notable requirements is that the corporation be organized to pursue one of a number 
of specific public purposes, such as charity, health care, education, scientific 
research, advocacy, or mutual benefit.30 Thus, even though state laws commonly 
allow nonprofits to be formed for any lawful purpose,31 the combination of market 
forces—the need to raise capital and desire for profits—and the allure of tax 
                                                          
 
23 Jami A. Maul, Comment, America’s Favorite “Nonprofits”: Taxation of the National Football 
League and Sports Organizations, 80 UMKC L. REV. 199, 199 (2011). 
24 Lester M. Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, In Search of the Non-profit Sector: The Question of 
Definitions, 3 VOLUNTAS 125, 126 (1992). 
25 There are a small number of federally-chartered organizations, including the Boy Scouts of America 
and the American Red Cross. See generally Paul E. Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations and 
Federal Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 317 (2009). 
26 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838–40 (1980). 
27 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.01(C) (West 2009); RMNCA, supra note 12, § 6.40(a). A small 
fraction of charitable entities are organized as trusts, which have distinct rules beyond the scope of this 
paper. See generally Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate 
Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 597–98 (1999). 
28 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 838. 
29 Mark Ascher, Federalization of the Law of Charity, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1581, 1591–1606 (2014). 
30 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015). 
31 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.03 (providing nonprofits can be formed “for any purpose or 
purposes for which natural persons lawfully may associate themselves”), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 180, § 4 (West 2010) (specifying allowable purposes). 
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exempt status—a primary reason to seek the nonprofit form—means that most 
nonprofit organizations further a limited set of purposes.32 
B. A Typology of Nonprofit Actors 
Both for-profits and nonprofits are formally governed by boards of directors, 
though how these directors are selected differs dramatically between sectors. In for-
profits, the owners of the enterprise are entitled to elect board members, who 
govern the organization and act as fiduciaries on behalf of the owners.33 In contrast, 
nonprofits do not have owners, so the nature of elections is more variable.34 Some 
nonprofit organizations have formal membership rolls, where members are allowed 
to elect the organization’s board of directors.35 Mutual benefit organizations,36 
homeowners’ associations,37 and labor unions38 are common examples of this type 
of organization.39 The right to elect directors places these members in a position 
similar to for-profit shareholders, but unlike for-profit shareholders, they do not 
“own” the organization’s assets and have no legal claim to any financial benefit 
from the organization.40 
                                                          
 
32 However, we note that not every nonprofit seeks tax-exempt status. See Kirsten A. Grønbjerg, Helen 
K. Liu & Thomas H. Pollak, Incorporated but Not IRS-Registered: Exploring the (Dark) Grey Fringes 
of the Nonprofit Universe, 39 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 925, 928–30 (2010). 
33 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 448 
(2001) (arguing that “[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should 
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value”); see infra Part II.B.3. 
34 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 842 (describing continuum between “mutual” and “entrepreneurial” 
control in nonprofits). 
35 RMNCA, supra note 12, § 6.30. 
36 Michael O’Neill, Philanthropic Dimensions of Mutual Benefit Organizations, 23 NONPROFIT & 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 3, 3 (1994). 
37 Pollack, supra note 14, at 861–62. 
38 Elections in labor unions are governed by federal law and monitored by the Department of Labor. See 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, 532–35 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–04 (2012)). 
39 Membership organizations can usually extend or limit their membership in whatever way they see fit, 
yet the threats of undue meddling or even of hostile takeovers prevent most organizations from 
extending membership too readily. Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost 
of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 ORE. L. REV. 829, 880 (2003). 
40 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 839. To complicate matters, some state laws actually allow a nonprofit 
organization to issue stock as a way of defining control of the organization. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17-6002(4) (Supp. 2014). These stockholders have power of control over the organization but not a 
right to the organization’s assets, essentially making them members by another name. Id. 
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Most nonprofits do not have voting members, though, which means that 
control over the organization is vested exclusively in a self-perpetuating board. 
Whether a nonprofit organization has a formal voting membership body or a self-
perpetuating board is up to the organization, and most organizations opt out of 
internal democracy.41 This leads to the problem, identified by Professor Reiser, that 
“private-regarding for-profit corporations are required to have more democratic 
internal governance structures than are supposedly public-regarding public benefit 
[member-less] nonprofit corporations.”42 Indeed, as noted below, the absence of 
any external political check on most nonprofit boards often leads to lower quality 
board members, which then serves as a strong argument against giving board 
members unchecked discretion to manage the organization’s affairs.43 
The differences between sectors grow as we look beyond governance.44 The 
for-profit story is a relatively straightforward one. Simply put, to achieve the 
wealth-maximization ends, the for-profit hires employees, commissions 
contractors, and supplies customers—all at fair market rates—with each expecting 
a quid pro quo out of the exchange. Under the ordinary contractarian model of 
corporate governance, the consumer and the employee receive full value for their 
                                                          
 
41 Karl S. Coplan, Is Voting Necessary? Organization Standing and Non-Voting Members of 
Environmental Advocacy Organizations, 14 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 55 (2005); Reiser, supra 
note 39, at 829, 865. There are also organizations that lack voting members but do have a semi-formal 
“membership” class without voting power. Museums, libraries, and zoos commonly offer yearly 
membership packages to interested patrons who wish to signal support for the organization. Audhesh K. 
Paswan & Lisa C. Troy, Non-profit Organization and Membership Motivation: An Exploration in the 
Museum Industry, 12 J. MKTG. THEORY & PRAC. 1 (2004). These nonvoting members may have a large 
amount of informal sway, but the lack of a formal vote places them on entirely different legal ground 
than voting members. 
42 Reiser, supra note 39, at 864. 
43 See infra Part II. 
44 One of the most persistent debates in the field of nonprofit studies is about defining the scope of a 
nonprofit’s constituency, which often assumes a normative position about who “should” count. See 
Natalie Brown, The Principal Problem: Towards a More Limited Role for Fiduciary Law in the 
Nonprofit Sector, 99 VA. L. REV. 879, 881 (2013) (noting larger question of whether nonprofits should 
be accountable to beneficiaries). We largely bypass the value-laden questions imbedded in the 
constituency debate, and instead propose a descriptive typology based on the ways in which different 
categories of actors interact with the organization based on their respective contributions to, and receipts 
from, the organization. See DENNIS YOUNG, IF NOT FOR PROFIT, FOR WHAT? 110 (2013). 
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input in terms of the good purchased or wages received, and thus do not retain any 
residual claim as stakeholders in the organization’s governance.45 
Like for-profits, nonprofits can have employees, contractors, and customers 
who expect to receive as much as they give.46 In fact, the majority of the nonprofit 
sector’s income, as measured in total dollars, is derived from fees for services. This 
phenomenon is largely driven by the massive scale of health-oriented commercial 
nonprofit organizations, such as hospitals and health plans, as well as tuition-
charging nonprofit colleges.47 These commercial nonprofits frequently compete 
directly with for-profits, charging similar market rates for the same services and 
often behaving very similarly.48 
However, nonprofits also obtain non-commercial revenue, as the nonprofit 
form facilitates donations of money and time in excess of a personal financial 
return.49 It is this altruism that allows the nonprofit to provide goods and services to 
beneficiaries, who receive something from the organization without providing 
equal value in exchange. The potential separation between contributor and recipient 
makes nonprofits a unique part of society.50 Under the standard economic account 
of nonprofit organizations, the ban on distributing the organization’s surpluses to 
owners encourages people to trust the organization and facilitates donations of time 
                                                          
 
45 Gerhard Speckbacher, Nonprofit Versus Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach, 18 
NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 295, 299–300 (2008). This point is actually the subject of an 
interesting debate: some contest the claim that all constituencies receive full value from the exchange, 
arguing that they continue to possess a residual claim on the organization. See, e.g., David Millon, 
Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 
1375–84 (1993). 
46 See Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 7, at 531–32. For nonprofit employees in particular, 
the issue of receiving full value is particularly tricky, since nonprofit wages are often lower than for-
profit equivalents, potentially leading the nonprofit employee to be a partial donor of labor. Id. 
47 Quick Facts About Nonprofits, URB. INST., http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2015); Katie Roeger et al., The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Public Charities, Giving, and 
Volunteering, URB. INST. 3 (2011), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412434-nonprofit 
AlmanacBrief2011.pdf. The fact that a majority of the sector’s revenue came from commercial 
transactions distorts a full picture of the field, as it is driven largely by the largest nonprofit 
organizations in terms of income. Id. These largest nonprofit organizations—those with spending more 
than $10 million a year—constitute 85% of the sector’s spending but only 4% of their number. Id. 
48 Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 7, at 511. 
49 YOUNG, supra note 44, at 28–35; Hansmann, supra note 7, at 500–04. 
50 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 850–51. 
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and money with the realistic hope that both will be used to further a valuable 
mission.51 
By tracing resource inputs to and outputs from the organization, we describe 
the different stakeholders present in the nonprofit sector, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Employees, customers, and contractors all provide input and receive output from 
the organization. When constructing these ideal types, we treat the input 
contributed as being of equal value to the output—that is, the employee receives a 
wage commensurate with the value of his labor, and the customer receives a good 
or service matching the amount paid. These types of market transactions are readily 
made in for-profit and nonprofit organizations alike. However, for the nonprofit, 
the link between input and output can be severed, giving rise to unique categories 
of constituencies.52 On the input side, we have donors of money and labor, who 
contribute to the organization without expectation of receiving quid pro quo in 
exchange. On the receiving side, we have the beneficiary, who receives something 
from the nonprofit without expectation of putting in equal value.53 As we will see, 
these different constituencies have dramatically different levels and types of 
influence within the organization. 
                                                          
 
51 Id. at 838, 847. 
52 YOUNG, supra note 44, at 110. 
53 We recognize that these are ideal types, and in many instances the precise line between customer and 
beneficiary will be hard to draw. For example, a client of a nonprofit whose care is partially subsidized 
through donations falls somewhere along a spectrum between beneficiary and customer. The point here 
is not to develop a rigid framework by which we can put every individual into a distinct box. That would 
not be feasible or useful. Rather, the framework we offer allows us to break down the flow of resources 
into and out of the organization and to conceptualize the various constituencies of these organizations. 
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Figure 1. A resource-based typology of actors between sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. GOVERNANCE OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
Both nonprofit and for-profit organizations are typically formalized as 
corporations.54 Under corporate law, both nonprofits and for-profits are governed 
by boards of directors who are responsible for selecting management, ensuring 
financial integrity, and otherwise guiding the organization. These directors must 
comply with fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience.55 When it comes to 
the enforcement of these duties, the law does little to distinguish between for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations—an approach criticized by many commentators, who 
argue that similar treatment in terms of rules of governance leads to widely 
dissimilar outcomes for the nonprofit sector. 
                                                          
 
54 George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, 
Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1149 
(2004) (“Nonprofit corporate statutes bear a strong resemblance to for-profit corporate statutes, 
notwithstanding the historical roots of charity regulation in trust law.”). See also Hansmann, supra note 
7, at 501. 
55 Hazen & Hazen, supra note 7, at 346. 
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A. The History and Sources of the Rules of Nonprofit 
Governance 
Legislation on nonprofit rules of governance commonly mimics the rules 
applicable to for-profit counterparts and simply makes minimal word 
substitutions.56 Indeed, Delaware—the undisputed ruler of corporate law—forces 
the nonprofit sphere into its general corporation code rather than set out a distinct 
chapter for nonprofit corporations.57 Moreover, state legislation on nonprofits is 
often outdated, terse, and ambiguous, leaving interpretation to the non-legislative 
arena.58 
This similar approach to for-profit and nonprofit governance is a development 
of relatively recent historical vintage. The early corporation in America was a 
servant of the public good. Prior to the American Revolution, little distinction was 
drawn between municipal (i.e., governmental) corporations and private 
corporations, which were overwhelmingly charitable, educational, or religious.59 
Business corporations existed, but with such constrained powers and purposes that 
they “would be considered cooperatives or quasi-philanthropic entities today.”60 
Originally, each corporation had to receive a specific corporate charter from the 
legislature, but even after general incorporation statutes were gradually enacted,61 
the early corporation was greatly limited in the amount of property that could be 
held and the purposes for which it could act.62 However, these restrictions were 
liberalized by the end of the nineteenth century.63 
                                                          
 
56 Lizabeth Moody, Revising the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act: Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est La 
Meme Chose, 41 GA. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (2007). 
57 John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Blake Rohrbacher, New Day for Nonstock Corporations: The 2010 
Amendments to Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 66 BUS. LAW. 271, 274 (2011). 
58 Thomas Boyd, Call to Reform the Duties of Directors under State Not-for-Profit Corporation 
Statutes, 72 IOWA L. REV. 725, 725 (1986) (“Directors’ duties and responsibilities are particularly 
ambiguous and obscure, leaving courts with insufficient guidance on what law to apply . . . .”). 
59 JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE FAITHLESS FIDUCIARY AND THE QUEST FOR CHARITABLE ACCOUNTABILITY 
1200–2005, at 242–43 (2007). 
60 Id. at 242–43. 
61 Id. at 245–46. 
62 Id. 
63 FREEMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 50. 
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Though sharing a common ancestor, the charitable and business corporations 
evolved at first on different tracks. As the business corporation developed under 
American law during the 1800s, it was “considered to be quite different” from the 
charitable corporations governed by stringent common law trust restrictions.64 
These differences became even starker as business organizations grew rapidly in 
size, and the fiduciary duties of for-profit directors were articulated and refined to 
revolve around shareholder maximization. 
By contrast, the rise of the charitable corporation was largely driven by a 
period of judicial and legislative skepticism for charitable trusts in the nineteenth 
century.65 The use of the corporate form became a way to evade this hostility 
toward legacy control over property.66 However, form mattered less than purpose 
when setting the duties of charitable administrators, and the stricter law of 
charitable trusts67 governed most aspects of charitable contributions, regardless of 
whether a corporate form was used.68 While courts stressed deference to business 
decisions of for-profit managers, they scrutinized nonprofit decisions under the 
strictures of trust law. 
The rules governing for-profit and nonprofit corporations would not stay 
separate for much longer, though. The modern law of nonprofit organizations is 
largely a product of private lawmaking groups in the last half of the twentieth 
century. The business corporate form was increasingly common, and corporate 
cases and scholars proliferated.69 Business corporate lawyers were appointed to 
create the first Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, and they borrowed heavily from 
their experience on the for-profit side of the economy.70 As a result, “[t]he first 
three versions (1952, 1957, and 1964) [of the ABA’s Model Nonprofit Corporation 
                                                          
 
64 Id. at 50; James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for 
Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 655 (1985). 
65 Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV. 433, 474 (1996). 
66 See FISHMAN, supra note 59, at 244; FREEMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 51; see generally Thomas E. 
Blackwell, Charitable Corporation and the Charitable Trust, 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (1938). 
67 Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What’s Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 
644–45 (2005). Trust law’s rigidity has been relaxed in recent years, to the point where leading scholar 
Evelyn Brody argues the difference between corporate and trust law standards is mostly non-existent in 
practice. Id. at 845. 
68 Fishman, supra note 64, at 655. 
69 Id. at 654–55. 
70 FISHMAN, supra note 59, at 268. 
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Act] almost slavishly followed either the effective or pending versions of the 
[Model Business Corporation Act].”71 
More recent law reform efforts have gathered more input from the charitable 
sector, but they remain stuck using the business corporation as the example. The 
revisions of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act in 1988 and 2000 largely 
followed the trend of the Act’s predecessors, expressly adopting “the policy of a 
parallelism, concluding that there were few basic differences, and that business law 
precedent was often applicable to nonprofit corporations.”72 Similarly, the ALI—
publisher of the influential “Restatements on the Law”—is currently amidst a 
years-long effort to articulate the “Principles of the Law of Charitable 
Organizations” (“Restatement”) using the rules of business corporations as its 
model.73 Both law reform efforts stated a willingness to depart from business law 
when the drafters felt it was necessary through ad hoc policy calls.74 Due to a lack 
of legal sophistication and an absence of interjurisdictional competition, earlier 
private proposals have worked their way into state legislation with minimal input 
from the nonprofit sector.75 
In 1960, Professor Karst criticized the overreliance on the corporate form for 
setting the law of charity: “A distinction which gives such great weight to 
organizational form rather than operational need carries a substantial burden of 
justification, and as yet that burden has not been met.”76 Even so, corporate 
similarities have tended to prevail, driven largely by the corporate label attached to 
                                                          
 
71 Moody, supra note 56, at 1346. 
72 Id. at 1346; Moody, supra note 4, at 256 (“It was determined that the Revised Act would parallel the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act except when the nature of nonprofit corporations or policy 
reasons applicable to nonprofit corporations dictated otherwise.”). 
73 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at 8–10. 
74 Id. at 7–8. 
75 Garry Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. 
REV. 1113, 1179–81 (2007) (“As a result of institutional norms and pressures, the legal elites of ALI, 
ABA, and NCCUSL have substantial influence on state law.”). However, the drafters of the recent ALI 
project and the most recent Revised Model Corporation Acts have sought input from the charitable 
sector during the drafting process. Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 7, at 540. 
76 Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 433, 436 (1960). 
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nonprofit organizations—often with questionable consequences.77 Fifty years later, 
the justification for these rules remains elusive. 
B. Judicial Enforcement of Duties 
In the ideal world, all directors comply with their fiduciary and moral 
obligations all of the time. In the real world, this does not always happen.78 When 
the fiduciary fails, courts have some power—though limited—to remedy the 
failing. For example, a person with standing can bring an action against a director 
of a nonprofit to enforce a fiduciary duty, and the court may impose monetary 
liability against the director or exercise its equitable powers to correct an abuse. In 
this part, we survey the “who,” “what,” and “how” of judicial review of directors’ 
fiduciary obligations, paying particular attention to doctrinal ambiguities, recent 
proposals by law reform projects, and the manner in which the rules interact with 
each other to define the relationship between the courts and the organization. 
1. Standing 
Not everyone can bring a director’s breach of a fiduciary duty to the attention 
of a court. In fact, by statute and by court decisions, states have tended to severely 
limit who has standing to challenge a board’s decision.79 
The formalism of corporate law insists that fiduciary duties are owed to the 
organization and thus strains to treat suits to enforce those duties as being brought 
on the organization’s behalf.80 Inspired by the ALI, we divide these causes of 
action that can be brought against a nonprofit’s fiduciaries into three categories.81 
First, since pursuit of the nonprofit’s best interest rests foremost with its governing 
board, the board can bring a suit on behalf of the organization against a wayward 
fiduciary.82 Second, as the implicit guardian of charity, the state’s attorney general 
can use judicial machinery to remedy fiduciary breaches under a lengthy tradition 
                                                          
 
77 Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries 
Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1187 (2001) (“Historical circumstances caused 
differing fiduciary duty standards to develop in connection with the particular legal form selected when 
creating private foundations.”); see generally Fishman, supra note 64. 
78 See generally FISHMAN, supra note 59 (cataloging 800 years of fiduciary abuses). 
79 See ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at 9–10; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 660, at 98 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2011) [hereinafter ALI (Draft No. 3)]. 
80 See Carlson v. Rabkin, 789 N.E.2d 1122, 1127–28 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
81 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at 6. 
82 Id. § 350, at 333. 
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grounded in English common law.83 However, it is commonly believed that state 
enforcement is frequently hindered by political or financial considerations.84 Third, 
if both the board and the attorney general fail to act, the organization’s interest in 
enforcement of fiduciary duties can sometimes be asserted through a derivative 
action.85 Such suits were originally recognized by the common law86 and have been 
explicitly recognized by approximately half of the states.87 Some jurisdictions 
follow the for-profit approach and require that a potential plaintiff must first 
present a derivative suit to the board, which has considerable power to decide 
whether it can be brought.88 
Thus, the range of possible actors who can bring suits against fiduciaries is 
narrow. Other than the board itself or the state’s attorney general, the only possible 
actors are those who can bring derivative actions, and not many are qualified for 
that responsibility.89 In the for-profit realm, only directors and shareholders can 
bring a derivative action.90 Some states and the Revised Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act apply this for-profit approach a bit too closely, simply replacing 
“shareholder” with “member.”91 This similar treatment leads to wildly dissimilar 
results between the sectors, since many nonprofit organizations lack any members 
at all, creating a void where no one has standing to challenge the misbehaving 
board.92 
                                                          
 
83 See ALI (Draft No. 3), supra note 79, § 610, at 3–4; see generally Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? 
Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004); David Villar 
Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A Historical 
Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2000). In addition 
to state enforcement, at least one court held that the United States—through its attorney general—can 
enforce fiduciary duties. Christiansen v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520, 528–30 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
84 Hansmann, supra note 7, at 600–01. 
85 See ALI (Draft No. 3), supra note 79, §§ 640–660, at 68, 73–74, 98. 
86 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 997 
(1930). 
87 See ALI (Draft No. 3), supra note 79, at 46–47. 
88 Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 887 (Minn. 2003). 
89 ALI (Draft No. 3), supra note 79, §§ 640–660, at 68, 73–74, 98. 
90 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
91 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-126-401 (West 2015); RMNCA, supra note 12, § 13.02. 
92 Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 
227, 240 (1999) (“But because of their limiting qualities [private rules of standing] have eviscerated the 
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Beyond these narrow classes of insiders, standing is, at best, a dubious 
prospect in the nonprofit realm. Several states and the ALI recognize a limited type 
of “special interest” standing.93 “[T]he contours of the exception are ill-defined,”94 
but it is thought to be very rare.95 Donors typically do not have standing,96 nor do 
the customers or beneficiaries of the nonprofit’s programs.97 For example, faculty 
and students of an educational institution have been held to lack standing to 
challenge the organization’s mismanagement.98 That said, limited standing is not 
the universal rule: applying D.C. law, the D.C. Circuit allowed patients of a 
hospital to enforce fiduciary duties because “justice requires someone to have 
standing, and it was the patients or nobody.”99 However, this more generous 
approach appears to be the exception rather than the rule. 
In these ways, standing to enforce nonprofit duties is markedly different than 
standing in the federal courts. The rules applicable in federal court are rooted in the 
jurisdictional provisions of Article III of the United States Constitution, which the 
Supreme Court has explained requires a plaintiff to show that he has suffered an 
“injury in fact” that is particularized, that is “fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant,” and for which it is “likely . . . that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”100 While the state standing doctrine in the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
ability of the already-tortured application of fiduciary rules to control nonprofit directors and 
managers.”). See also Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 506 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“This right, however, is not effective where, as here, a nonprofit corporation has 
no members.”). 
93 Brody, supra note 83, at 1031. 
94 In re United Effort Plan Trust, 296 P.3d 742, 750 (Utah 2013). 
95 See ALI (Draft No. 3), supra note 79, § 680, at 135; Blasko et al., supra note 8, at 76. 
96 Brody, supra note 8, at 1187. 
97 ALI (Draft No. 3), supra note 79, at 100 (“Conspicuously missing from the classes of potential 
plaintiffs to bring a derivative suit are current and potential beneficiaries, whom the law views simply as 
members of the general public.”). See also Petty v. Hosp. Serv. Ass’n of N.E. Pa., 23 A.3d 1004, 1012 
(Pa. 2011) (holding that subscribers to nonprofit health insurer lacked standing); Consumers Union, Inc. 
v. State, 840 N.E.2d 68, 80 (N.Y. 2005) (“Plaintiffs are merely purchasers of health insurance, parties to 
a commercial transaction with Empire.”). 
98 FREEMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 331 (citing Warren v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 544 
S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), In re Barnes Foundation, 684 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), and 
Steeneck v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688 (Conn. 1995)). 
99 Christiansen v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
100 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992) (citation omitted); see Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“Is the injury too abstract, or otherwise not appropriate, to be considered 
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nonprofit context is not constitutionally based, which means it has the potential to 
be more flexible,101 it is in fact substantially stingier than federal court rules. For 
example, in federal courts and under the doctrine just discussed, a beneficiary of a 
government program would plainly have standing to challenge a change to that 
regulatory program.102 By contrast, although beneficiaries of nonprofit programs 
might satisfy Article III’s requirement of particularized harm, they are still barred 
by state law from attempting to remedy their injury against the erring board. 
Scholars love to hate the doctrine of Article III standing,103 and the same 
holds true for standing in the context of nonprofit duties.104 The argument for 
expanded standing in the nonprofit context notes that existing enforcement 
mechanisms are likely inadequate to police abuses. Some have convincingly argued 
that state attorneys general base their oversight on political reasons divorced from 
the best interests of the organization, the beneficiaries, or the public good.105 
Moreover, granting standing only to directors of an organization permits the very 
individuals who played a role in the decision to get a second bite at the apple, while 
denying any rights to beneficiaries who were not given a seat at the table, but who 
suffer a more personalized harm from the organization’s action. Not surprisingly, 
the argument for increased standing often strikes a tone of fairness, positing that 
beneficiaries who are harmed by an organization’s unlawful decisions should be 
                                                                                                                                      
 
judicially cognizable? Is the line of causation between the illegal conduct and injury too attenuated? Is 
the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling too speculative?”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 
(2014). 
101 See ALI (Draft No. 3), supra note 79, at 46–47; In re Milton Hershey School, 867 A.2d 674, 683–84 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (describing standing as “flexible”), rev’d, 911 A.2d 1258 (2006). 
102 See Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 7 (2000). 
103 See Joseph Mead, Interagency Litigation and Article III, 47 GA. L. REV. 1217, 1226 (2013) (“The 
standing doctrine has been criticized with a consensus and harshness without equal among other 
doctrines.”); see also Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? 
An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 594 (2010) 
(“[S]tanding remains one of the most contested areas of federal law, with criticisms of the doctrine 
nearing the number of commentators.”). 
104 See generally Nix, supra note 8. 
105 See, e.g., Brody, supra note 83, at 947–48; Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, 
Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
749, 758 (2008). 
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able to remedy the breach in court.106 The common rationale that standing protects 
charity from judicial micromanagement through a flood of litigation is empirically 
ungrounded and better addressed by calibrating the standards of review or adopting 
fee-shifting provisions.107 
Like standing in federal court, the debate over nonprofit standing rules 
reflects important policy disagreements about the distribution of power between 
institutions and the types of interests that warrant judicial protection. In federal 
courts, what does or ought to constitute an “injury” is in large part linked to the 
conception of the role of the courts in a particular context.108 Put another way, 
allocating standing forces courts to make judgments as to whose grievances are 
deserving of judicial attention, and in what circumstances they are so deserving.109 
Therefore, scholars have used the development of standing doctrine as a lens 
through which to examine the ways that courts regulate access to the judicial 
system, and, in turn, the ways that courts value certain injuries and define 
remedies.110 In particular, some argue that access to the courts through standing is 
especially important for individuals who lack points of access to raise their 
grievances in the political system.111 The same can be said in the context of 
                                                          
 
106 See Atkinson, supra note 8, at 670 (“Much of the power of the case for expanded standing lies in its 
appeal to fundamental fairness.”). 
107 See Nix, supra note 8, at 167. 
108 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single 
basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”). 
109 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 892 (1983) (“The degree to which the courts become converted into 
political forums depends not merely upon what issues they are permitted to address, but also upon when 
and at whose instance they are permitted to address them.”). 
110 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?—TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR 
NATURAL OBJECTS 35 (William Kaufmann ed., 1974), available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/ 
icb.topic498371.files/Stone.Trees_Standing.pdf (“Some of the most important questions of ‘right’ . . . 
turn into questions of degree: how much review, and of which sort, will which state agencies accord us 
when we claim our ‘right’ is being infringed?”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between 
Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 648–82 
(2006); Mead, supra note 103, at 1275 (arguing that justiciability doctrines value some injuries more 
than others); Karen Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts, 70 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 723, 725 (1976) (“Standing . . . shifts the parameters within which groups may operate: what 
may now be asked of the court in the way of judgments, injunctions, and so on; and the range of social 
enterprises open to challenge.”). 
111 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 
322 (2002) (“[I]t is far better to come down on the side of those who are having the hardest time of 
it. . . . Standing law, regrettably, repeatedly violates this fundamental set of lessons.”); id. at 326 (“It is 
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nonprofits. As Rob Atkinson aptly summarized, “[t]he question of who should have 
standing to sue charitable fiduciaries ultimately comes round to what kind of 
charity we want to have, to what we think charity is, and what we want it to be.”112 
Accordingly, we consider standing not only as an instrument for enforcing specific 
duties, but as an important option to deploy when an institution does not provide its 
own internal accountability mechanisms and when we conclude from a normative 
or policy perspective that such a failure is in need of a remedy. 
2. Standards of Judicial Review 
As important as the question of “who” is the question “for what?” Following 
the for-profit model, injured parties with standing can ask the court to enforce 
fiduciary duties, but the law prescribes highly deferential standards for reviewing a 
board’s exercise of fiduciary duties, at least so long as the right process is followed. 
Although scholars count and define the number of fiduciary duties 
differently,113 a common articulation is that nonprofit directors have duties of care, 
loyalty, and obedience.114 The duty of care requires each director to become 
appropriately informed and to act with the care that a reasonably prudent person 
would exercise in similar circumstances.115 The duty of loyalty requires directors to 
act to further the best interests of the organization.116 Finally, the duty of obedience 
requires that the directors adhere to the requirements of law and the organization’s 
governing documents.117 However, these standards are merely the default rules. 
Borrowing from a common practice in the corporate world, the ALI proposes that 
nonprofit boards may increase their insulation from judicial scrutiny by further 
                                                                                                                                      
 
difficult to understand the eased standing requirements in . . . cases . . . filed in pursuit of majoritarian 
interests. It is not as if there is a structural reason to believe that such claims will fall on deaf ears in the 
halls of the legislature.”); Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 488, 490 
(2008). 
112 Atkinson, supra note 8, at 698. 
113 See, e.g., Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1231, 1232–35 (2009). 
114 Goldschmid, supra note 2, at 638–40. 
115 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, § 315, at 91. 
116 Id. at 40. 
117 The duty of obedience is sometimes described as a subcomponent of the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., 
David Rigney, Duties and Potential Liabilities of Officers and Directors of Nonprofit Organizations, in 
NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 83, 87–88 (Victor Futter ed., 2002). We find it useful 
analytically to discuss it separately. 
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relaxing the duties owed by members to the organization, albeit within certain 
limits.118 In contrast, the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act does not permit 
charitable corporations to reduce the fiduciary duties owed by directors.119 
a. Duty of Care 
The duty of care requires directors to exercise reasonable judgment. This 
encompasses a duty to actually exercise judgment––total abdication of oversight of 
an organization would be a breach of the duty––and to be reasonable in decision-
making. Reasonable reliance on information or counsel is typically acceptable.120 
While reasonableness is the standard prescribed for directors, courts employ 
an even more deferential enforcement posture under the business judgment rule.121 
Although, as the name suggests, it has been most fully adopted in the business 
context, most jurisdictions also apply the rule to nonprofit organizations.122 Under 
the business judgment rule, a court does not second-guess the decision made by a 
board if the decision could reasonably be thought to be in the best interest of the 
organization and was the product of reasonable attentiveness.123 Sometimes, as in 
                                                          
 
118 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, § 305. 
119 RMNCA, supra note 12, § 2.02(c). 
120 Id. § 8.30(d)–(f). 
121 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 
247, 299–300 (1999) (“[I]n practice the duty of care is all but eviscerated by a legal doctrine known as 
the ‘business judgment rule.’” (citation omitted)). Whether the business judgment rule modifies the 
standard of care, or instead simply prescribes a standard of review, is unimportant to our argument, 
which focuses on the standards used by reviewing courts. See Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of 
Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1139 (2013) (noting “the 
enigmatic relationship between the duty of care and the business judgment rule”). 
122 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, § 365 (“The business judgment rule—and the name—enjoys wide 
judicial acceptance in the nonprofit context.”); Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, The 
Business Judgment Rule and Other Protections for the Conduct of Not-for-Profit Directors, 33 J. 
HEALTH L. 455–84, 459 (2000) (“While most commonly associated with the actions of for-profit 
directors, there is a growing acceptance that the Rule is equally applicable to the actions of not-for-profit 
directors.”); see Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003) (“Other states have 
applied the business judgment rule to decisions of nonprofit corporations, explicitly or implicitly. We 
find no case denying a nonprofit organization the protection of the business judgment rule.”); cf. James 
Edward Harris, The Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1993: Considering the Election to Apply the New Law 
to Old Corporations, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 18 (1994) (“Uncertainty exists as to whether and 
under what circumstances the business judgment rule may be applied to nonprofit corporations.”). Some 
have suggested that the business judgment rule be renamed the “best judgment rule” for nonprofit 
organizations. FREEMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 209 n.110. 
123 Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 122.  
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Delaware, this is articulated as a gross negligence standard.124 However, at other 
times, it appears to provide effectively absolute protection, so long as the proper 
procedures were followed.125 A common articulation is that directors are presumed 
to have “acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company,” absent 
evidence of “fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or 
betterment.”126 
Thus, the business judgment rule does not permit non-management; generally, 
it does not protect a director who unreasonably fails to attend meetings or 
participate in governing decisions.127 However, it does provide protection to 
directors who make “honest mistakes of judgment.”128 Courts worry that if an 
organization’s decisions were scrutinized with the benefit of hindsight, judges 
would too quickly find fault where there was error.129 The business judgment rule 
is also based on the premise that directors have more expertise than courts and that 
investors prefer business decisions in the board room instead of the courtroom.130 
Finally, the business judgment rule reduces the risk of monetary liability for 
individual directors who make a mistake in judgment.131 
                                                          
 
124 Goldschmid, supra note 2, at 642. 
125 Pollack, supra note 14, at 848; Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule: Should It 
Protect Nonprofit Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 965 (2003) (“When directors find themselves 
subject to a gross negligence standard under the business judgment rule, they realize that they are 
essentially subject to no standard of care at all regarding the substance of their decisions.”). 
126 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (quotations omitted), decision 
modified on reargument on other grounds, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
127 Bank of Hartford v. Bultron, Inc., No. SP-H-9296-65684, 1992 WL 436242, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 21, 1992). The business judgment rule also may have less of a role to play where there are 
allegations of disloyal or disobedient conduct, as we discuss further below. See In re Fleming Packaging 
Corp., 351 B.R. 626, 634 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006); HOWARD L. OLECK & MARTHA E. STEWART, 
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, & ASSOCIATIONS 900 (6th ed. 1994). 
128 Jaclyn A. Cherry, Update: The Current State of Nonprofit Director Liability, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 557, 
561 (1998). 
129 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 
119 (2004). 
130 These assumptions are tested by the institutional model, as laid out below in Part III.B.3. 
131 FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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Application of the business judgment rule to nonprofits is neither universal 
nor beyond controversy.132 Scholars have argued that nonprofit organizations lack 
some of the same means of accountability as for-profit boards and that they should 
be held to the far stricter standards of a charitable trustee,133 or, at minimum, to the 
ordinary negligence standard.134 Yet the trend among courts is to strongly favor the 
application of the business judgment rule to nonprofits.135 Both the ALI’s 
Restatement and the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act propose some version of the 
business judgment rule, but each articulates the standard in significantly different 
ways.136 The Restatement emphasizes that the rule is only available to directors 
who are not personally interested in the transaction.137 In contrast, the Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act extends business judgment rule deference even to 
directors laboring under a conflict of interest, so long as the director reasonably 
believed that the decision was in the best interests of the organization.138 Both 
formulations contemplate a highly deferential posture in fiduciary litigation 
alleging bad director judgment. 
b. Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty requires directors to act in the best interest of the 
organization, not their own self-interest.139 The duty of loyalty is most regularly 
implicated by conflicts of interest, as a board considers a course of action affecting 
                                                          
 
132 FREEMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 210 (“In the nonprofit context, there is some debate whether 
courts should ever apply the business judgment rule.”); Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 122, at 194 
(“Another active duty-of-care controversy is the extent to which the [b]usiness [j]udgment [r]ule is 
applicable to nonprofit corporations. Despite the rather explicit position of the Revised Model Act and 
its drafters, and the views of commentators in the field, some attorneys general have resisted its 
application in certain circumstances. As such, it cannot be said with certainty that the [b]usiness 
[j]udgment [r]ule applies uniformly in all states to protect the decision making of nonprofit directors.”). 
133 Boyd, supra note 58, at 727. 
134 Lee, supra note 125, at 944. 
135 Id. at 927. 
136 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, § 365(a). 
137 Id. § 365(c). 
138 RMNCA, supra note 12, § 8.31. 
139 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, § 310. 
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a board member’s financial interests or another obligation of the board member, 
such as a fiduciary duty owed to a competing nonprofit “trustees’”organization.140 
At common law, trust law flatly banned trustees’ self-dealing.141 Even self-
dealing transactions in the best interest of the trust were prohibited.142 Although the 
trust law standard originally applied to corporate directors as well, the rules were 
relaxed for for-profit directors.143 Today, transactions involving a director of a for-
profit can be approved by disinterested directors, with minimal judicial review of 
the merits of a ratified transaction.144 If an interested transaction is not approved by 
a majority of disinterested directors, then it must be fair to the organization; the 
burden of proving that an interested transaction is unfair rests on the party 
challenging the transaction.145 
As trust and corporate loyalty requirements diverged, nonprofits once more 
found themselves falling in an uncertain middle ground.146 Although a majority of 
states apply the business standard to nonprofits, commentary has been sharply 
critical of the trend toward approving conflicted transactions, and “the majority of 
scholars who have analyzed modern formulations of the duty of loyalty . . . have 
decided that it is now too lenient.”147 Accordingly, some scholars call for “a flat 
prohibition against all self-dealing transactions” for nonprofit organizations.148 
Though some states are exceptions, most states have not heeded this call.149 In 
                                                          
 
140 State law standards have been supplemented by strict, specific IRS rules regarding self-dealing 
transactions for those organizations wishing to remain tax-exempt. FREEMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 
237. 
141 Id. at 195. 
142 Id. 
143 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, § 330. 
144 Id. 
145 Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 903, 923 
(2011). 
146 FREEMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 216. 
147 Id. at 236. 
148 Hansmann, supra note 7, at 569. 
149 For example, Delaware makes the duty of loyalty stricter for nonprofit directors than for those on for-
profit boards, scrutinizing the substance of a conflicted transaction even when approved by legally 
disinterested directors. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445 (Del. 1991) (en banc); see also DeMott, 
supra note 10, at 143; Hansmann, supra note 7, at 568. That Delaware has grasped this nuance is all the 
more noteworthy given that Delaware does not even have a separate nonprofit corporation law, but 
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particular, the law reform projects suggest that directors can enter into transactions 
with themselves, escaping external oversight so long as they can establish that the 
transaction is “fair.”150 
c. Duty of Obedience 
Whereas loyalty requires the exclusion of other influences on the director’s 
decision-making, obedience requires not simply a pure mind, but also that the 
decision substantively further the organization’s mission.151 Whether it is treated as 
a standalone duty or simply a subcomponent of one of the above, the requirement 
of director obedience plays an important and underappreciated role in both for-
profits and, especially, nonprofits. 
The conventional wisdom is that, in the for-profit world, the duty of 
obedience is almost a dead letter.152 Corporate charters regularly establish “any 
lawful purpose” as the organization’s aims,153 and the phrase “duty of obedience” 
rarely appears in reported decisions. At times, though, courts still do intervene and 
hold for-profit directors and officers to obey one type of for-profit mission: the 
maximization of shareholder wealth.154 This mandate was famously articulated 
nearly one-hundred years ago in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, which opined that 
the managers of Ford were required by law to consider the interests of shareholders 
first and foremost.155 In the years that followed, the judicially cognizable version of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
instead folds nonprofit corporations into its for-profit corporate law scheme. See Mary A. Jacobson, 
Nonprofit Corporations: Conversion to For-Profit Corporate Status and Nonprofit Corporation 
Members’ Rights—Farahpour v. DCX, Inc., 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 635, 635 (1995). 
150 RMNCA, supra note 12, § 8.60; see ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, § 330 (allowing fairness 
review so long as the fiduciary disclosed the conflict). 
151 Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board Discretion 
over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 699–700 
(2005). The decision also must comply with the law; all corporations, for-profit and nonprofit alike, are 
limited to the pursuit of lawful purposes only. 
152 Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43, 54 (2008). In fact, 
some commentators argue that “[t]he duty of obedience . . . does not have a for-profit counterpart” at all. 
Peggy Sasso, Comment, Searching for Trust in the Not-for-Profit Boardroom: Looking Beyond the Duty 
of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1485, 1530 (2003). 
153 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011). 
154 Katz, supra note 151, at 699 (“Just as a for-profit board should aim to maximize shareholder value, 
so too should a charitable board aim to maximize the fulfillment of the organization’s mission.”); Sasso, 
supra note 152, at 1528. 
155 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The 
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this mandate was enforced so infrequently in court that a robust academic debate 
developed as to whether it was extinct or ever really existed.156 The debate was 
reinvigorated by a recent Delaware court, which found Craigslist’s directors in 
breach of their fiduciary duties for expressly considering public benefit goals above 
shareholder value: 
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the [C]raigslist directors are bound 
by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards 
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean at least that.157 
This duty of obedience to the norm of shareholder wealth maximization can 
be understood as a default rule of corporate law. Absent a more specific mission—
agreed to by the owners and reflected in the organization’s charter—the reasonable 
presumption is that the primary mission of the corporations is to make money for 
the owners.158 However, state statutory regimes are flexible enough to allow 
modification to this default rule.159 As for-profit organizations explicitly adopt non-
financial missions, we might expect an increasing rise in the relevance of the duty 
of obedience to ensure compliance with non-financial missions as well.160 On the 
flip side, we might presume that a corporation that declines to adopt a narrower 
mission is adopting the default mission of shareholder wealth maximization, and 
investors buy in to the company with that understanding.161 Notwithstanding what 
                                                                                                                                      
 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to 
a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among 
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”). 
156 Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate about Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 
535 (2006) (“[T]he question whether managers are obligated to maximize shareholder profits remains as 
ambiguous as ever.”). 
157 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also Lyman Johnson, 
Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 405, 438 (2013). 
158 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 783–84 
(2005). 
159 Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990). 
160 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770–71 & n.23 (2014) (“[I]t is not at all uncommon 
for [for-profit corporations] to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.”). 
161 James Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1598–99 (2013). 
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might be, most for-profits today are oriented to maximize profits and adopt broad 
articles of incorporation for that purpose. Thus, it remains a rare event to see a for-
profit case turn on the duty of obedience. 
The landscape is dramatically different for nonprofit organizations, which are 
commonly aligned with far more limited purposes. For a nonprofit organization, 
the duty to obey a mission—a mission that cannot be shareholder wealth 
maximization—is its raison d’être. Organizations seeking tax-exempt status from 
the IRS must submit articles of incorporation that limit the organization to 
particular purposes.162 Donors are not buying a simple product, but offer a 
contribution based on an assumption—sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit—
that the organization will use the donation to further that purpose.163 As a result, the 
organization’s managers are expected to act in furtherance of the organization’s 
mission.164 Based on the relatively narrow missions of many nonprofits and the 
greater reliance placed by investors/donors on those specific missions, courts 
actively police director mission obedience.165 
                                                          
 
162 IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 557, TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 5, 24 
(2015). 
163 Nat’l Found. v. First Nat’l Bank of Catawba Cnty., 288 F.2d 831, 836 (4th Cir. 1961) (“Every gift to 
The National Foundation, in a sense, is a gift in trust. Its use, with other gifts, is limited to activity in 
furtherance of the donee’s corporate purposes, or to such other purposes to which they properly might 
be applied under the cy-pres doctrine. Donated funds are dedicated to the charitable objects of the 
corporation and may not be diverted to other use.”). 
164 The implicit assumption that donors contribute in reliance on a nonprofit’s mission is strikingly 
similar to the implicit assumption that shareholders invest in reliance on the for-profit’s pursuit of 
profits. If a for-profit adopts a different mission, then investment decisions will presumably be driven in 
part on the basis of that new mission, and the courts should accordingly hold the for-profit to its stated 
ends. 
165 As one court put it: 
It is axiomatic that the Board of Directors is charged with the duty to ensure 
that the mission of the charitable corporation is carried out. This duty has 
been referred to as the “duty of obedience.” It requires the director of a not-
for-profit corporation to “be faithful to the purposes and goals of the 
organization,” since “[u]nlike business corporations, whose ultimate 
objective is to make money, nonprofit corporations are defined by their 
specific objectives: perpetuation of particular activities are central to the 
raison d’être of the organization.” 
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). 
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The expectation of nonprofit mission obedience may seem straightforward on 
the surface, but it is difficult in practice.166 Translating an abstract mission167 into 
concrete action is wrought with difficult judgment calls and interpretive 
dilemmas.168 Indeed, given the complexities of both defining the mission and 
determining how to measure it, “[t]here are some who posit that fulfilling the non-
profit duties of care and obedience are actually more difficult and complex than 
focusing on maximizing profits.”169 Still, notwithstanding the difficult judgment 
calls that inhere in complex and ambiguous missions, courts are willing to second 
guess board decisions to police perceived deviations. For example, a New York 
court prohibited the sale of a charitable specialty hospital’s assets after finding that 
the sale would not further the organization’s mission.170 At least in some 
jurisdictions, the question of whether an organization is complying with its mission 
is reviewed without the deference of the business judgment rule.171 
Another difficulty with mission enforcement through a strong duty of 
obedience comes from the omnipresent march of time, threatening obsolescence to 
even the best of missions. For example, the March of Dimes was established to 
fight polio, but it found itself seeking new meaning following polio’s cure.172 A 
rigid focus on the existing mission, without a beneficiary-focused “duty to assure 
that the trust is meeting contemporaneous needs . . . does not set forth an 
appropriate standard.”173 Corporate law allows the board to amend the articles of 
                                                          
 
166 Johnny Rex Buckles, How Deep are the Springs of Obedience Norms That Bind the Overseers of 
Charities?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 913, 920–24 (2013). 
167 Indeed, there is often ambiguity with defining a nonprofit’s “mission.” See, e.g., Melanie DiPietro, 
Duty of Obedience: A Medieval Explanation for Modern Nonprofit Governance Accountability, 46 DUQ. 
L. REV. 99, 122 (2007) (distinguishing between mission, purpose, and public benefit, and noting that 
“[t]his author has not found a generally acceptable definition of ‘mission’ by commentators using the 
term”). 
168 Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into 
Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 895 (2007) (“[T]he core of what makes charities unique, desirable, 
and worth subsidizing is somewhat ephemeral and virtually nonjusticiable.”). 
169 John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3c Fiduciary 
Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 161 n.103 (2010). 
170 Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 597. 
171 Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 529 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 
172 David Rose, A History of the March of Dimes, MARCH DIMES (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.marchof 
dimes.com/mission/a-history-of-the-march-of-dimes.aspx. 
173 FREEMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 226. 
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incorporation to revise the organization’s mission, but there is a divide among 
academics and jurisdictions whether the act of revising is, itself, bound by the 
strictures of the existing mission.174 For those jurisdictions that impose a duty to the 
original mission,175 organizations can only adapt to modern problems by obtaining 
judicial approval through the cumbersome cy pres process.176 The modern trend, 
and the one favored by the latest ALI Restatement,177 gives the board expansive 
power to amend the organization’s mission.178 
3. Remedies & Immunities 
If there is both a plaintiff with standing and a breach of one of the fiduciary 
duties, then the courts must determine which remedy they will employ. Although 
the remedy stage occurs at the end of a case, the type of remedies at stake has 
important implications for who is able and willing to sue and what standard the 
court will use to judge the behavior. Indeed, remedies are important not only once 
an issue is in litigation, but as a form of ex ante deterrence before a breach even 
occurs. Like standing and standards, the types of remedies available reflect 
judgment calls about the relationship between judicial and corporate institutions. 
Following the corporate model, the preferred judicial remedy in the case of a 
fiduciary breach in the nonprofit context is an equitable one—an accounting, 
specific performance, an injunction, or restitution—with the goal of undoing 
whatever act violates the fiduciary duty. This is often accompanied by a declaratory 
judgment that a breach occurred. For well-meaning but poor-acting boards, this 
slap on the wrist may be enough admonition to spur more attentive oversight in the 
future. Other equitable remedies may be more intrusive. A common type of relief 
                                                          
 
174 Id. at 439–40; Katz, supra note 151, at 689–90. 
175 RMNCA, supra note 12, § 10.09(b); Attorney Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 
(Mass. 1986) (rejecting argument that board can amend charter and apply pre-amendment, unrestricted 
assets to new purpose because the public could not trust that the funds donated would be used for the 
intended purpose); Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 595 (“[T]he duty of obedience . . . mandates that a Board, in 
the first instance, seek to preserve its original mission.”). 
176 See generally Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111 (1993). Although cy 
pres is typically a doctrine for revising specific bequests, it has been applied to the modification of an 
organization’s mission as well. Christopher Lacovara, Strange Creatures: A Hybrid Approach to 
Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 815, 848 n.140 (2011) (“The 
limitation on the ability of fiduciaries to alter the charitable purposes of a nonprofit organization, 
combined with the perpetual existence of a corporation, gave rise to the doctrine of cy pres.”). 
177 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at 310 cmt. (a)(1). 
178 Katz, supra note 151, at 690–91. 
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involves a judicial mandate to change some aspect of the governance structure to 
prevent recidivism, often by implementing a new policy or procedure.179 Although 
more disfavored, another remedy is to remove the offending board members from 
their posts.180 
Money judgments are highly disfavored as a matter of policy in the nonprofit 
sector—even more so than in the for-profit world. This is so whether the money 
damages are considered equitable, as in an order of restitution, or legal, as in an 
award of damages. At the federal level, concern that nonprofits were having 
difficulty recruiting qualified board members, or that board decision-making would 
be distorted by undue threats of liability, led to the enactment of the Federal 
Volunteer Protection Act (“VPA”), which immunizes all volunteers, including 
directors, from monetary liability for negligent acts.181 However, the VPA does not 
immunize directors against suits brought by the organization itself, and derivative 
actions—the very actions where a fiduciary duty can be asserted—likely fall within 
this exception, leaving the director exposed to monetary liability.182 
The vast majority of states also statutorily immunize volunteer directors from 
monetary liability for acts made in good faith within the scope of their role for the 
organization, though the scope of this protection varies from state to state.183 Some 
states mirror the federal VPA and immunize directors for negligence, but not gross 
negligence.184 Others immunize directors unless they act intentionally or 
willfully.185 Although both of these immunities provide considerable protection 
against monetary judgments to individuals who fall within their scope, there are 
several limitations that make them relatively minor players in fiduciary litigation. 
Significantly, these statutes often do not extend immunity to suits brought by the 
attorney general, which is likely the biggest threat of monetary liability faced by 
                                                          
 
179 Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat. Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 
1018 (D.D.C. 1974); ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at 360 cmt. (b). 
180 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at 360 cmt. (b). 
181 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–14505 (2012). 
182 Melucci v. Sackman, 961 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Table) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
183 Jill R. Horwitz & Joseph Mead, Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws and 
Tort Deterrence, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 633–35 (2009). 
184 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.38(C) (West 2009). 
185 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 867 (West 2012). 
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nonprofit directors given the relative lack of standing of other interested parties.186 
Moreover, it is less certain how immunity applies in suits brought by an 
organization, which, technically, is how fiduciary litigation is viewed.187 Finally, as 
a practical matter, an allegation that a director breached a duty of loyalty will likely 
fall outside the scope of the immunities because it will be deemed intentional 
misconduct or an act in bad faith.188 Thus, although seemingly broad at first glance, 
director immunity from monetary judgments provides fairly weak protection to 
volunteer directors. 
Beyond statutory immunity is contractual immunity—a concept aggressively 
developed in the for-profit context.189 Many jurisdictions permit a nonprofit to 
indemnify directors for judgments or their legal expenses, absent a showing of 
intentional misconduct or bad faith.190 Moreover, nonprofit organizations are often 
encouraged to purchase liability insurance for their directors and officers to hedge 
against the risk of litigation.191 Both statutory and contractual immunity decrease 
the likelihood that a nonprofit director will be held financially responsible for 
mismanagement. 
4. Summary 
As Professor Fallon has persuasively argued, the doctrines of standing, 
standards, and remedies interact to create a complex allocation of power between 
courts and organizations.192 The above discussion demonstrates that they combine 
to create a hands-off posture for judicial oversight of corporate directors in both 
                                                          
 
186 CAL. CORP. CODE § 5239(e)(2) (West 2014); MINN. STAT. § 317A.257(2)(a)(1) (1989) (exempting 
from scope of immunity “an action or proceeding brought by the attorney general for a breach of a 
fiduciary duty as a director”). 
187 Melucci, 961 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Table). 
188 See, e.g., Am. Baptist Churches of Metro. N.Y. v. Galloway, 271 A.D.2d 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); 
Brody, supra note 67, at 657 (“[M]any state nonprofit corporation statutes permit the articles of 
incorporation to contain a personal monetary ‘liability shield’ for directors who, in good faith, breach 
the duty of care (but not the duty of loyalty).”). 
189 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). In some types of for-profit corporations, fiduciary duties 
can even be eliminated entirely. Id. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c); Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of 
Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of Good Faith for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 
(2006). 
190 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at 380. 
191 Cherry, supra note 128, at 569. 
192 Fallon, supra note 110, at 683. 
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nonprofit and for-profit organizations. Figure 2 sets out the similarities between the 
for-profit and nonprofit rules discussed above, as well as any departure in the 
nonprofit context. The similarities are truly striking. Indeed, it appears quite plain 
that the law of nonprofit organizations continues to develop toward “corporate law 
parallelism,”193 as courts treat nonprofits under a “corporate model.”194 
Figure 2. Summary of For-Profit and Nonprofit Fiduciary Rules 
 Summary of For- 
Profit Rule 
Nonprofit 
Parallelism 
Nonprofit 
Departure 
Standing Treat cause of action as 
belonging to 
organization; allow 
directors and owners 
only to enforce 
Cause of action 
belongs to 
organization; limit 
standing to directors 
and members, 
creating standing 
void for memberless 
organizations 
Occasional “special 
interest” standing 
Duty of 
Care 
Business judgment rule 
protects reasonable 
judgment calls  
Most jurisdictions 
apply business 
judgment rule to 
board judgment 
calls 
Some jurisdictions have 
not expressly adopted 
business judgment rule 
for nonprofits 
Duty of 
Loyalty 
Defer to conflicted 
transactions when 
approved by 
disinterested directors 
Modern trend to 
adopt for-profit 
standard of review 
Some jurisdictions apply 
higher standard and 
review all transactions 
for fairness 
Duty of 
Obedience 
Minimally-enforced 
obligation to maximize 
profits 
Modern trend to 
allow board to 
amend mission at 
will 
More specific missions 
for nonprofits; obligation 
more closely policed; 
board decisions 
scrutinized for 
compliance with mission 
Remedies Organizations can agree 
to relax fiduciary 
standards, indemnify 
directors, and pay for 
director insurance 
Same default rights 
and remedies as for-
profits 
Additional statutory 
immunity for 
uncompensated directors; 
Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act does not 
allow charitable 
corporations to modify 
fiduciary obligations 
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For-profit law’s influence on nonprofit governance is easy to observe across 
all doctrines. Even where nonprofit law imposes a different standard than the for-
profit analog, the departures are relatively minor in contrast to the similarities. 
Further, those instances where nonprofit law does impose a higher standard for 
directors are counteracted by “stingier” rules of standing at the front end and 
additional forms of immunity at the back end.195 The movement towards increasing 
parallelism means an increase in what nonprofit directors can get away with—
latitude that could be used to work against the best interest of the organization. 
With the relatively parallel legal treatment of for-profits and nonprofits, the 
question arises whether that parallelism is warranted. After all, it is plainly not 
enough to base the nonprofit legal regime on historical quirks or the fact that we 
call most of them “corporations.” Even a casual observer recognizes that there are 
often dramatic differences between for-profit and nonprofit organizations. 
Therefore, some scholars argue that for-profit rules of standing, deferential 
standards, and immunities are ill-suited for nonprofits196 and observe that 
nonprofits lack the sort of clear performance metrics, financially-motivated owners, 
vigorous market-based checks, and sophisticated governance structures that 
characterize the for-profit arena.197 Moreover, as donors are often not able to verify 
product quality before donating, they instead rely on the non-distribution proxy,198 
which, in turn, constrains nonprofit decision-making in a way not experienced by 
for-profits199 and causes the missteps of one organization’s leaders to reverberate 
throughout the sector.200 The next part of this Article engages with this debate by 
                                                          
 
195 Hazen & Hazen, supra note 7, at 363 (“[W]hile the law imposes high standards of responsibility on 
nonprofit directors, it incongruously includes significant limitations on board accountability for 
wrongdoing or lack of oversight.”). 
196 Id. 
197 Boyd, supra note 58, at 744; DeMott, supra note 10, at 140; Goldschmid, supra note 2, at 648; Lee, 
supra note 125, at 950–52; Howard L. Oleck, Proprietary Mentality and the New Non-Profit 
Corporation Laws, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 145 (1971). 
198 Hansmann, supra note 26, at 835. 
199 For example, some argue that nonprofits should be more risk-averse than for-profits. See Barry 
Bozeman & Gordon Kingsley, Risk Culture in Public and Private Organizations, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
109 (1998); Keenan Wellar, Embracing Risk in the Shift from “Program Thinking” to “Social Change 
Thinking,” NONPROFIT Q. (July 30, 2012), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/management/20732-embracing 
-risk-in-the-shift-from-program-thinking-to-social-change-thinking.html. When it comes to choosing 
investments, the default legal rule in most jurisdictions is that trustees are held to a reasonable investor 
standard, which allows some measure of risk as long as it is consistent with the charitable mission. See 
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 212–14. 
200 DeMott, supra note 10, at 146–47; Mead, supra note 9, at 885–86. 
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proposing five internal accountability metrics and assessing the for-profit firm and 
the nonprofit corporation against those metrics. 
III. APPLYING AN INSTITUTIONAL MODEL FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
As the above discussion illustrates, there is considerable debate in the 
nonprofit literature about the propriety and utility of the current judicial regime 
surrounding nonprofit organizations. This debate spans justiciability doctrines like 
standing and deference doctrines like the business judgment rule. While the 
existing literature has yielded potentially profitable ideas, it has not systematically 
assessed whether the prevailing regime is correctly tailored to the institution and 
constituents at issue. In this part, we endeavor to fill that gap. First, we set out a set 
of institutional characteristics that are relevant to this question and then evaluate 
the nonprofit organization against these metrics, focusing on the different 
constituencies outlined above. By pinpointing how and for whom the existing 
mechanisms of judicial review are suited to the nonprofit, we can both offer a more 
rigorous defense of the status quo with respect to certain constituencies and target 
for possible reform those constituencies and circumstances most in need of it. 
A. The Institutional Analysis Approach to Judicial Review of 
Corporate Governance 
How should courts decide how to engage in judicial review? Scholars have 
“almost never treat[ed] deference as a subject in and of itself,”201 but this meta-
question of how to construct an institutionally or contextually appropriate 
mechanism of judicial review is in need of attention because, without it, courts all 
too often permit inertia or historical accident to form the basis of the review they 
exercise. This is certainly the case in the context of the homeowners’ association,202 
and as we have shown here, it is the case in the context of the nonprofit corporation 
as well. 
The solution we offer is to analyze a series of characteristics of the particular 
institution that speak to its internal mechanisms of accountability, its expertise, and 
the need for either of those features.203 After all, on the occasions when courts do 
consider the bases for judicial review and deference—as in the context of 
                                                          
 
201 Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1070 (2008). 
202 Pollack, supra note 14, at 849–52. 
203 Id. at 844–46. 
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legislative, administrative, or for-profit corporate decision-making—they tend to 
consider these characteristics.204 In other words, judicial rationales for deference 
tend to turn on judicial conceptions, accurate or not, of the decision-making 
structure in the institution in question and the relative superiority of that structure 
compared to that of the courts. Moreover, approaching the question in this 
accountability or representationally focused manner has a rich basis in the 
participatory democracy literature.205 As such, assessing how accountable a given 
governing entity is to its constituents, and determining how much accountability 
matters in the context of the particular institution, yields conclusions that can form 
the basis of a considered and tailored approach to judicial review that fits the needs 
of the institution, its constituents, or, from a court’s perspective, the defendants and 
the plaintiffs before it.206 These conclusions can either put doctrines that developed 
through inertia on firmer footing, suggest tweaks to those doctrines, or illustrate a 
need for a reexamination of the field. 
First, we assess the opportunities for exit from the organization. Drawing on 
Albert Hirschman’s insights, this concept of exit is a central way in which 
constituents can communicate dissatisfaction to the institution.207 Whether it is 
                                                          
 
204 See, e.g., Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (discussing agencies’ 
superior accountability and expertise relative to courts); Bainbridge, supra note 129, at 117–24 (noting 
that the case for deference would be weaker “if judicial decision making could flawlessly sort out sound 
decisions with unfortunate outcomes from poor decisions, and directors were confident that there was no 
risk of hindsight-based liability,” but that this is not the case because “judges are not business experts”); 
Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1426 (1994) (noting 
that deference is “predicated on an assumption that those who make decisions that bind associations, 
typically the board of directors, are representative of the association’s members,” and “[t]o the extent 
that this is not true, the relationship between the parties provides little reason for the court to [defer]”). 
205 See Neil K. Komesar, A Job for Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and 
Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 667–68, 677–78, 690 (1988) (explaining that assumption of 
judicial deference to political processes may be overcome where processes malfunction in terms of 
failures of representation); see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); NEIL K. 
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (1994). More recent efforts by scholars of administrative law and of nonprofit corporations have 
taken a similar path. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of 
the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 856–65 (2002); Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2007) (analyzing features of 
administrative agencies and arguing that the Court develops administrative law doctrines with attention 
to agencies’ real, operational characteristics and with the goal of developing procedural rules that 
improve decisional legitimacy). 
206 Brody, supra note 205, at 900–01; Pollack, supra note 14, at 853 (discussing why “accountability is 
the place to start”). 
207 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 21 (1970); Pollack, supra note 14, at 853–54. 
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selling shares, voting for another candidate, or patronizing a different brand, exit 
works best as an accountability device when it is easy and fast: easy, because it 
eliminates other variables or reasons to stay and thus increases the salience of the 
signal; and fast, because it ensures a more apparent causal linkage.208 
Second, we look at the opportunities for voice within the organization. If exit 
is difficult or slow, the ability to work within the institution to change it offers a 
satisfying accountability substitute. However, just as salience is important for exit 
to be a useful form of accountability, voice must not only be effective, but 
perceived ex ante by constituents to be an endeavor that is likely to be effective or 
at least taken seriously. Absent that likelihood, few rational constituents would 
invest the resources necessary to be heard.209 
The availability of exit and voice depends not only on the cost of exercising 
these options, but also on the cost of monitoring. It is not enough to decide to leave 
or to speak, but one must also gain enough information to form an opinion. As we 
unpack below, these information costs are relatively high in several scenarios 
familiar to the nonprofit universe. Indeed, Hansmann’s trust theory—the dominant 
economic theory of the nonprofit form—places enormous weight on the high 
monitoring costs accompanying much of what nonprofits do.210 
Third, in the absence of either of these levers of internal accountability, we 
examine whether a court is well-situated to address the institution’s lack of 
accountability. An institution’s relevant expertise compared to that of the courts is 
widely understood to be a central consideration in the question of deference, and it 
is at this point in the analysis that it comes into play.211 
The final two characteristics answer the question whether a lack of 
accountability may be acceptable in light of the nature of the relationship between 
the institution and its constituents. If the answer is yes, a form of deference or a 
doctrine of nonjusticiability may remain warranted even in the absence of internal 
                                                          
 
208 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 207, at 24. 
209 Id. at 39. 
210 See generally Hansmann, supra note 26. 
211 See, e.g., Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984); Thomas W. Merrill & 
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J 833, 866 (2001) (noting that Chevron deference is 
rooted in large part in the Court’s observation that “agencies typically have greater expertise about 
technical and specialized subjects than do courts”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 
DUKE L.J. 549, 556 (2009) (same). 
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accountability or relative expertise because the costs of enforcing the issue are 
outweighed by the costs of judicial review.212 The likely impact range of an 
institutional decision is a metric that captures the set of rights or expectations that 
one enters into the institution with and that may hang in the balance in an 
institutional decision.213 When these are low or relatively unimportant, the set of 
cases likely to arise out of the particular institution will rank low on the set of 
demands made on courts, and a rule of deference may be justified.214 Similarly, the 
more that the interests of those who run an institution align with the interests of 
affected constituencies, and the more the constituencies’ interests are themselves 
homogeneous, the less need there is for judicial intervention.215 
These characteristics are not evaluated in a strict equation per se, but rather 
guide an inquiry into the functioning of a particular institution. The first two—exit 
and voice—are where the analysis begins, and they are of paramount importance 
because they reflect the degree to which the institution may be responsive to or 
beholden to its constituents. The third, expertise, is nearly as central because it is 
widely viewed as an acceptable substitute for the accountability provided by exit 
and voice. The final two may be viewed as a set of brakes, checking our response 
to an institution’s lack of accountability or expertise in those contexts additional 
oversight may be too costly or ill-advised. 
B. Evaluating Nonprofit and For-Profit Corporations 
Because the law uses for-profit law as the baseline for nonprofit rules, we use 
the institutional characteristics of for-profit firms as the comparator for nonprofit 
organizations in this section. We then draw on available empirical evidence and 
theoretical literature to carry out the analysis, using the constituent typology 
developed in Part I. 
1. Exit 
In the for-profit context, constituent exit is easy for both the shareholder and 
customer constituents. The shareholder who is dissatisfied with the board’s 
decision-making can simply sell his shares on the market, where both buyers and 
alternative investments abound. Such divestment, which can be accomplished with 
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low transaction costs, accomplishes a complete disassociation from the institution. 
If a decision causes enough shareholders to disassociate in such a fashion, the 
consequences can be dramatic, and the threat of such action thus imposes ex ante 
constraints on board decision-making.216 
The same ease of exit often holds true for the customer constituent. If the 
board makes a decision that either degrades the quality of the product or that 
simply is inconsistent with customers’ social or policy preferences the customer 
can generally vote with his feet in the same way that the shareholder can by 
patronizing a competitor. Of course, we recognize that there are some caveats. For 
one, this assumes that the customer has relevant information about the product or 
policy, and most consumers have incentives to invest only minimal time in learning 
about most of the companies with which they interact. It also is made more 
complicated by the prospect of a monopoly or even a business that functions as a 
local monopoly in practice—say, the only car dealership in town. Moreover, 
consumer product preferences, including price, may drown out governing 
preferences, as when a consumer prefers shoes made from a particular shoemaker, 
regardless of the environmental or labor policies employed in the shoe’s 
manufacturing. In such a circumstance, customer behavior will be less responsive 
to the corporate action. Still, these nuances can be carried through the analysis 
without calling into question the ultimate conclusion that the for-profit corporation 
performs highly on the exit metric of accountability, certainly for shareholders and, 
with some issues of degree at the margins, for customers as well. 
In the nonprofit context, constituent exit functions similarly as an 
accountability tool at the donor/member level analogous to that of the for-profit 
shareholder—but somewhat less well at the customer level, and strikingly less well 
at the beneficiary level. However, there are nuances worth unpacking, so we begin 
with donor exit. Donors are highly mobile: those who are dissatisfied with the 
decisions of a nonprofit board can, like the shareholder, vote with their feet by 
simply ceasing to donate to that organization. For example, when Susan G. Komen 
for the Cure, a well-known breast cancer research nonprofit, made the widely 
publicized decision to stop giving grants to Planned Parenthood for breast cancer 
screenings, it saw its donations drop by a staggering 22%. Participation in the 
organization’s Races for the Cure, and the accompanying race fees and 
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contributions, also dropped off precipitously.217 The speed and volume of the 
reaction reflects the ease with which donor constituents can exit the organization. 
Indeed, the fact that, within months, the organization reversed its decision perhaps 
illustrates the effectiveness of that exit.218 Of course, the decision was met with a 
firestorm of criticism and public relations consequences separate and apart from the 
drop in contributions, so it would be an overstatement to say that the donor reaction 
was the cause of the policy reversal. However, this analysis does not require that a 
specific exercise of exit in fact caused a specific policy change, but rather that there 
is an easy structural mechanism for constituents to exit. The availability and use of 
this lever of accountability is what ultimately matters, and a donor can exit an 
organization as easily as putting down the checkbook and either finding one of 
many rival organizations to take the money,219 or, worse, cutting back on the 
amount given to charity entirely.220 In short, having already parted with his initial 
donation, the donor has no further link holding himself to that particular 
organization. 
The availability of donor exit is not limited to such dramatic policy changes 
or public relations disasters. Indeed, donors may exit due to real or perceived 
changes in the quality of the organization’s effectiveness or priorities.221 Most 
nonprofits publicize reports of their spending, and websites like Charity Navigator 
are devoted to comparing and evaluating the effectiveness of charities based on 
metrics like financial efficiency—program expenses versus administrative 
expenses versus fundraising expenses—and reporting transparency.222 Donors who 
do not approve of, say, the spending habits of the organization or the ratio of 
program expenses to administrative expenses or salaries, are free to take their 
                                                          
 
217 Associated Press, Komen Sees Big Drop in Contributions After Dispute, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2014, 
7:32 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/susan-g-komen-contributions-after-dispute-101743 
.html. 
218 Pam Belluck et al., Cancer Group Backs Down on Cutting off Planned Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/health/policy/komen-breast-cancer-group-reverses-
decision-that-cut-off-planned-parenthood.html?pagewanted=all. 
219 Carol Chetkovich & Peter Frumkin, Balancing Margin and Mission: Nonprofit Competition in 
Charitable Versus Fee-Based Programs, 35 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 564 (2003). 
220 Id. at 584, 586. 
221 Margaret F. Sloan, The Effects of Nonprofit Accountability Ratings on Donor Behavior, 38 
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 220–36 (2009). 
222 How Do We Rate Charities?, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay= 
content.view&cpid=1284#.Vl3-vYQdJFI (last visited Dec. 1, 2015). 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  3 2 2  |  V O L .  7 7  |  2 0 1 6  
 
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2016.404 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
money elsewhere—either to another charity serving the same goals, another charity 
entirely, or no charity at all. Indeed, there are an increasing number of 
organizations pursuing a stagnant pot of money.223 Knowing this, and eager to tout 
the approval of evaluators like Charity Navigator, charitable nonprofits are 
disciplined by donors ex ante, in the form of the prospect of exit, as well as ex post, 
much like for-profits are by shareholders. 
However, the strength of this discipline in practice is open to some debate.224 
Scholars have observed that, in spite of these avenues for information and donor 
exit, nonprofits “are widely regarded as much less well-governed and subject to 
much less oversight than the average public company” and that these information-
providing resources “pale in comparison with the investors, analysts, watchdogs, 
and government agencies monitoring every move made by large[] for-profit 
firms.”225 The information costs to donors of verifying where donations go are 
high, which is part of the reason for the nonprofit form in the first place,226 and 
absent actual knowledge, the emotional benefit and tax advantage to the donor is 
equal whether the donation is squandered or life-changing. Moreover, although the 
IRS releases tax filings from tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, this provides a 
very basic insight into the organization’s functioning, compared to the lengthy and 
highly detailed information that must be provided by publicly-traded firms.227 
Although nonprofits are encouraged to provide additional information as a matter 
of good governance, this remains entirely a matter of discretion, which allows 
nonprofits to provide positive information and keep hidden the negative.228 Still, 
despite the information costs, the nonprofit is an institution in which the act of exit 
is generally an easy, available, and low-cost discipline tool for donors. 
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Dissatisfied members may also resort to generally easy avenues of exit. As 
discussed above, membership in these organizations is usually voluntary, so, like 
the donor, the member often faces no structural constraints on his or her exit. 
Moreover, effecting the exit is a decidedly low-transaction cost maneuver: simply 
stop paying dues, ignore junk mail, or send an email asking to be removed from a 
mailing list. Of course, this is not to say that member exit is always free in every 
sense. For example, the Boy Scout brand is well-known and the organization is 
pervasive, so parents who wish a scout-like experience for their children may have 
limited alternative options. There is a cost attendant to identifying a new 
organization with the desired mission, practices, and quality. It may be costlier for 
a member who has built a reputation or assumed a leadership position within an 
organization, or who has established friendships with other members, as might 
happen when one’s children befriend fellow scout, to exit the organization. 
Moreover, there is not always abundant competition, and the existing organization 
may have a wealth of resources—consider a lodge or a church—that cannot be met 
elsewhere, or that would be difficult to create from scratch.229 While the economic 
costs of exit are very low, the emotional costs of exit may be a factor in this context 
in a way that it is not present in that of the corporate shareholder. 
Still, it is rare for a single nonprofit to dominate a sector like the Boy Scouts 
do. For most members, the ease of exit is facilitated by a large amount of 
competition for members and a relative ease of creating a competing organization 
where there is not one already.230 A conservation-minded individual has numerous 
environmental groups from which to choose, depending on preferences about 
tactics, areas of emphasis, and so forth.231 Moreover, the number of available 
organizations continues to grow each year232—to say nothing of less formal 
associational options provided by social media.233 Starting a rival business might 
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require lots of capital, but starting a membership organization has very low start-up 
costs, allowing a plethora of associations to multiply to cater to every preference. 
For example, exploiting political divisions from the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act, the Association of Mature American Citizens positioned itself as a 
conservative version of the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”).234 
However, where membership is not entirely voluntary—in the sense that it is 
tied to some other interest, making it what we call an “interest-linked 
membership”—exit is not so simple. For example, membership in a homeowners’ 
association and payment of dues are almost always required when one purchases 
property in the community.235 Membership in a labor union, or, at least, payment of 
dues, may also be required to maintain certain employment.236 In these situations, 
exiting the membership organization means exiting the entire relationship and 
forfeiting other interests. For this reason, the homeowners’ association is an 
institution from which exit is not a generally available form of accountability.237 
Similarly, although exit from labor unions is a complex subject that merits further 
study,238 it is certainly a far more difficult notion in that context—which explains 
why federal law strictly oversees labor union elections to ensure fairness.239 
At the donor/member level, we conclude that exit is a generally easy and 
available lever of institutional accountability, at least roughly on par with that of 
the for-profit corporation. However, certain member organizations in which 
membership is required by virtue of some other important interest are exceptions to 
this rule. 
At the customer level, exit is almost as easy as it is for the for-profit’s 
customer, but not exactly. Both can choose to switch to a competitor, or, failing 
competition, forgo receiving the service altogether.240 Additionally, the customer 
has fairly little skin in the game, beyond the cost of whatever product being 
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purchased. So long as the customer receives the goods or services for which he 
bargained, he has little basis to complain about other activities of the organization. 
That said, the nature of some relationships between customer and nonprofit may be 
relatively less fluid. For example, it may be moderately difficult for a student to 
transfer credits from one university to another.241 Still, the difficulty does not 
depend on the ownership character of the university. In fact, the customer may not 
even know the nonprofit/for-profit status of the supplier.242 In other words, it is not 
the institution itself, but rather the nature of the service provided, that could make 
exit moderately more difficult in the nonprofit context. After all, nonprofit 
organizations generally settle in less profitable markets and provide less profitable 
goods and services due to the inability of nonprofit insiders to personally profit 
from the organization’s activities. When they do, they fill an important niche.243 
Accordingly, we predict that, in the aggregate, the nonprofit customer may be 
somewhat more limited in his ability to choose a competitor than a for-profit 
customer, although the differences are probably minimal. 
Like customers, nonprofit staff members typically enjoy roughly the same 
opportunities of exit as in the for-profit sector. In either sector, finding a new job is 
not always easy. Yet nonprofits compete for talent not only on salary, but also by 
providing an opportunity to fulfill important non-monetary goals.244 A nonprofit 
that stops fulfilling its mission will often find it hard to compete with for-profits on 
financial incentives alone, risking a loss of top talent to the competition. 
By contrast, exit is almost always difficult for the beneficiary.245 Whereas the 
customer comes with dollars and can go elsewhere, the beneficiary of the nonprofit 
                                                          
 
241 Sara R. Kusiak, Comment, The Case for A.U. (Accountable Universities): Enforcing University 
Administrator Fiduciary Duties Through Student Derivative Suits, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 129, 173 & n.280 
(2006). 
242 See generally Florian Drevs et al., Do Patient Perceptions Vary with Ownership Status? A Study of 
Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Public Hospital Patients, 43 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 164 
(2014); Femida Handy et al., The Discerning Consumer: Is Nonprofit Status a Factor?, 39 NONPROFIT 
& VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 866 (2010). 
243 See generally Jill Horwitz, Making Profits and Providing Care: Comparing Nonprofit, For-Profit, 
and Government Hospitals, 24 HEALTH AFF. 790 (2005). 
244 See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 701 (1996). 
245 Aseem Prakash & Mary Kay Gugerty, Trust but Verify? Voluntary Regulation Programs in the 
Nonprofit Sector, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 22, 26 (2010) (“These beneficiaries typically cannot vote 
with their feet (or dollars), or even voice their disapproval. For them, nonprofits are often the monopoly 
providers of essential products and services.”). 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  3 2 6  |  V O L .  7 7  |  2 0 1 6  
 
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2016.404 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
is often not in a position to be “choosy.” Beneficiaries rely on nonprofit 
organizations for food, medical services, housing, and other life-sustaining 
services. Accordingly, recipients of, say, a food bank’s food are unable to express 
disapproval with the decisions of the food bank by rejecting the food, both for 
structural reasons—the absence of a channel for that feedback, as discussed 
below—and for practical ones—the organization does not rely on the beneficiaries 
for resources. A beneficiary may thus have little choice but to accept charity on the 
terms that the organization offers.246 Moreover, when a charity chooses to exclude 
a potential beneficiary, the beneficiary cannot further exit an organization when 
already placed on the outside. For example, the families who face eviction from 
homeless shelters into the bitterness of a New York winter have exit forced upon 
them; there is no way to signal disapproval to the agency by exiting twice.247 As a 
result, at the beneficiary level, neither exit nor the prospect of exit are effective 
levers of accountability, meaning that “nonprofits have a greater power advantage 
relative to the people they serve than for-profit businesses have relative to their 
customers—or than politicians, arguably, have vis-à-vis constituents.”248 
2. Voice 
Shareholders of for-profit corporations have a formal vote regarding who 
serves on the board, yet they have few opportunities for effective voice beyond the 
ballot. Indeed, a shareholder’s voice is largely limited to his vote in director 
elections and on any proposal for which a shareholder vote is required.249 All of the 
other corporate decisions are, by design, made by the directors and managers on 
their own.250 In this way, the opportunities for voice are roughly equivalent to those 
in our representative democracy, with one important qualification: whereas every 
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citizen gets one vote in our political system,251 every share, not every shareholder, 
gets one vote in the corporation.252 
The same is true for customers, who have no formal mechanism to make 
themselves heard within the corporation’s functioning. However, “voice, while 
always valuable, is most important when exit is difficult.”253 Because exit, as 
discussed above, is a low-cost, high-impact form of accountability in the for-profit 
corporation for both the shareholder and the customer, these limitations on voice 
are less worrisome than they would otherwise be in that context. 
In the nonprofit context, we again divide the analysis by constituency. For 
donors, like for-profit shareholders, the opportunities for voice are limited. In fact, 
they are even more limited because donors do not even have the ability to cast a 
vote for leadership or on any policy questions. Whereas shareholders at least have 
the theoretical ability to influence the direction of the corporation or the decisions 
the board makes, nonprofit donors lack even that. For example, it is certainly not as 
if the American Red Cross (“Red Cross”), sends donors a proxy card along with the 
free return-address labels. 
Some have argued that, “[i]n the charitable sector, one voice can uniquely 
trump all others: the donor’s.”254 However, this concept of “voice” does not 
generally reflect the structural paths for voice on which we focus. Rather, ad hoc 
public relations crises or the real and perceived need to keep donors happy is best 
understood, not as a form of voice, but as a salient ex ante form of exit discipline, 
as noted above.255 In other words, charities certainly recognize the need to keep the 
donors happy as a class. Reliant on their beneficence, charities often cater to 
donors’ whims.256 This was highlighted by the controversy over the Red Cross’ use 
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of donations following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.257 After an 
enormous outpouring of generosity that exceeded the amount needed to address 
post-tragedy needs, the Red Cross announced that it would use some of the donated 
funds to bolster infrastructure for future emergencies.258 Somewhat irrationally, 
donors were upset that the donations were not being used to directly aid the victims 
of this particular disaster.259 To satisfy donors, the Red Cross departed from its 
longstanding policy, and rather than prepare for the next disaster, the organization 
began to fritter away the gigantic endowment by offering large cash payments to 
New York residents merely inconvenienced by the attacks.260 For our purposes, 
though, this was not a form of donor voice because it did not use a channel of 
institutional access. Rather, it was a form of ex ante disciplining by the prospect of 
donor exit: the Red Cross recognized that it needed to keep donors happy in order 
to continue to receive donations. Absent that consideration, there was nothing—no 
vote needed—to prevent the Red Cross from sticking to its policy. 
Although exit continues to be the donor’s biggest stick, it is not as if donors 
have no means of vocalizing in the organization. Even though courts were once 
reluctant to allow donors to enforce restrictions written into gifts,261 and even 
though tax law discouraged undue donor control over gifts once they pass to a 
charity,262 sophisticated donors can structure their gifts to impose legally 
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enforceable obligations on the nonprofit organization.263 Moreover, scholars have 
documented an increasing trend among the wealthiest donors to retain greater 
amounts of formal control over large donations.264 Further, given the importance of 
donors to many nonprofits’ models, certain donors may be afforded a place of 
honor within the organization. For example, major donors are commonly invited to 
serve on the board of directors. In that capacity, they are no longer simply “donor” 
constituents, but decision-makers. The organization may treat them not simply as 
major donors, but as representatives of donor interests, articulating at the highest 
levels of the organization the attributed perspective of the donor class. 
However, for members, structural opportunities for voice are stronger than for 
donors as a group, and perhaps even stronger than for shareholders in the for-profit 
context. Formal membership comes with voting rights by definition, so there is an 
institutional structure in place for the exercise of member voice that is not present 
for the exercise of donor voice. This distinction is especially important in light of 
the exit conclusion reached above. Recall that, while exit is generally easy in the 
context of the membership organization, it may be less so when membership is tied 
to some other interest like employment or home ownership. In those situations, 
these interest-linked members may have the ability to resort to stronger avenues of 
voice. 
We say “may” because the promise of member voice is often illusory in 
practice. “[M]any elections in membership organizations are characterized by low 
turnout rate and lack of democracy, and members may be marginalized in relation 
to board members and management.”265 Specifically, the opportunities for voice in 
the context of the homeowners’ association appear promising, but still prove to be 
largely unavailing due to a range of structural factors.266 Labor unions and other 
nonprofits of this type merit further study, precisely because exit from them is 
difficult. 
Voice tends to be stronger for nonprofit staff, paid and unpaid, as compared 
with for-profit staff. Nonprofit scholars have noted that the actual functioning of 
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nonprofits looks more like an inverted hierarchy, where nonprofit “executives 
typically have greater information, more expertise, and a greater stake in and 
identification with the organization,” leading to considerable power for the 
nonprofit senior management.267 True, many businesses have strong executives as 
well, but, as will be discussed in greater detail below, board monitoring and 
oversight is typically more meaningful in the for-profit realm. The tendency to 
devolve power leads to nonprofit staff in a position of greater power compared to 
the business employee, at least at the level of senior management. 
Finally, we turn to the customer and beneficiary level. For both, voice is 
weak. There are often no formal institutional structures to give customers or 
beneficiaries the opportunity to shape the direction of the organization or to control 
its priorities. They do not get a vote, and there are no other points of formal access 
to vocalize within the institution. They are left to lobby for their priorities and 
complain of deficiencies, but nothing compels the organization to listen.268 
Recognizing this problem, some of the nonprofit literature calls for greater 
empowerment or participatory governance, but these have largely not come to 
pass.269 Further, even these would still fail to offer a formal mechanism of voice 
within the organization. For example, organizations might place a token beneficiary 
or customer on the board of directors, perhaps believing that the interests of 
beneficiaries can be expressed through that assigned representative.270 Use of an 
unelected representative is something, but it is not the same as the formal vote 
given to for-profit shareholders. Perhaps some organizations choose to take 
meetings or provide groups of potential beneficiaries with the opportunity to make 
their pitches,271 but these sorts of voluntary listening tours are markedly different 
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options are generally limited to refusing the service (exit) or complaining about it (voice).”). 
269 See Gregory D. Saxton, The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management, NONPROFIT Q. 
(Aug. 2, 2012), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/management/20769-the-participatory-revolution-in-
nonprofit-management.html; Ostrander, supra note 243. 
270 Kelly LeRoux, Paternalistic or Participatory Governance? Examining Opportunities for Client 
Participation in Nonprofit Social Service Organizations, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 504, 510 (2009) 
(reporting that 49% of surveyed organizations have a client on the board). 
271 Saxton, supra note 269. 
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from the sorts of institutional central lines to decision-makers that are generally 
considered avenues for voice. Such discretionary access stands in sharp contrast to 
the mandate on federal administrative agencies to consider the viewpoints of 
interested parties, which include both regulated entities and “beneficiaries” of the 
regulation—industry groups and environmental groups in the context of the EPA, 
to use a blunt example—during regulatory processes.272 Tracing formal “points of 
institutional access” that are not granted at the discretion of the institution,273 the 
customer and beneficiary both plainly lack the access that the member of a 
membership nonprofit theoretically has. 
Beginning to put the pieces together, we see that from the perspectives of the 
donor and customer, exit is relatively easy and is thus an effective means of 
accountability. By contrast, voice is very limited. Accountability from the donor’s 
perspective thus relies almost entirely on exit. From the perspective of the member 
of a nonprofit without any connected interests, exit is also easy, but at least some 
opportunities for voice are also an available mechanism for accountability. This 
puts members ahead of donors in terms of access to levers of accountability and on 
similar footing with for-profit shareholders. However, when membership is linked 
to other interests, exit is much harder. The opportunity for voice might balance the 
accountability inquiry, but the promise of that opportunity may be more theoretical 
than real. In contrast, the employee enjoys significant voice within the nonprofit in 
light of the hands-off nature of most boards and the staff’s greater involvement and 
identification with the organization’s activities. Lastly, from the perspective of the 
beneficiary, neither exit nor voice is an effective means of accountability. As we 
move into the final three characteristics, all of which have to do with substitutes for 
these mechanisms of institutional accountability, we will have to pay closest 
attention to the cases of the interest-linked member and the beneficiary. These 
represent the sharpest departures from the for-profit corporation’s mechanisms for 
exit and voice, since the donor and the non-interest-linked member perform 
similarly well on those scores. 
3. Expertise 
When exit and voice are poor mechanisms of institutional accountability, we 
must look elsewhere for a justification for judicial deference or applications of 
                                                          
 
272 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining 
that an agency must “respond to ‘relevant’ and ‘significant’ public comments” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
273 Pollack, supra note 14, at 854. 
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doctrines of nonjusticiability. For instance, in the contexts of administrative law, 
foreign affairs law, and others, courts generally and primarily look to the 
government’s relative expertise as a basis for granting deference.274 
In for-profit organizations, directors are picked because they have, or are 
presumed to have, a business acumen that is respected by corporate law.275 Thus, as 
one court put it: “Not only do businessmen know more about business than judges 
do, but competition in the product and labor markets and in the market for 
corporate control provides sufficient punishment for businessmen who commit 
more than their share of business mistakes.”276 
By contrast, for nonprofit boards, there are relatively weak external 
motivations to obtain expert board members, at least when one conceives of 
expertise in the sense of business acumen. Nonprofit organizations lack 
shareholders, and their boards are often self-perpetuating such that existing board 
members elect new directors.277 Moreover, nonprofit board members commonly 
serve without compensation,278 which at times leads to difficulty attracting 
qualified personnel.279 On the other hand, for-profit directors are generally well-
compensated for their service. According to a 2013 survey, for-profit directors 
generally receive more than $100,000 per year for their part-time service on a 
                                                          
 
274 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Proj., 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2711 (2010) (“[R]espect for the Government’s 
factual conclusions is appropriate in light of the courts’ lack of expertise with respect to national 
security and foreign affairs . . . .”); Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(highlighting comparative agency expertise as basis for deferring to reasonable agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes). 
275 Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are Delaware Courts 
Ready to Force Corporate Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531, 
544 (2005) (“A core principle of Delaware corporate law, the business judgment rule exemplifies the 
judiciary’s extreme deference to directors’ business decisions and Delaware’s value on the social utility 
of treating directors as experts in evaluating corporate risk.”). 
276 Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 (Conn. 1994) (quoting Dynamics Corp. of 
Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
277 Reiser, supra note 39, at 829. 
278 Hazen & Hazen, supra note 7, at 393–94. There are some exceptions to the norm of uncompensated 
directors in some large foundations and in many commercial nonprofit organizations, such as health 
plans. Id. 
279 NAT’L SURVEY OF NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY ORGS., RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF 
VOLUNTEERS 1–2 (2006), available at http://www.imaginecanada.ca/sites/default/files/www/en/nsnvo/ 
l_recruiting_retaining_volunteers_factsheet.pdf. 
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board.280 Even beyond compensation, a board member of a business commonly 
owns shares that rise and fall with the organization’s performance; a nonprofit 
board member often benefits simply by being on a board, regardless of how the 
organization performs.281 
The criteria used for selecting directors also differ between the sectors. While 
the for-profit sector values the effective businessperson, the nonprofit sector 
primarily values the willingness to donate large sums of money to the organization, 
a commitment to the organization’s mission, or political or social connections that 
may prove useful to the organization.282 Even worse, nonprofit boards rarely 
resemble the population the nonprofit is designed to serve.283 This is not the case of 
every nonprofit board. Indeed, some nonprofits or some conditions of government 
funding explicitly require that a certain fraction of board members represent the 
population that the nonprofit serves.284 However, the problem of board 
representation can lead to what Lester M. Salamon has termed “philanthropic 
paternalism,” where the organization adopts the perspective of its donors rather 
than its clients, focusing on the problems and solutions favored by the wealthy and 
powerful in society rather than the intended beneficiaries.285 In certain contexts, 
particularly those having to do with rights or interests of beneficiaries, this bias not 
only fails to overcome a general lack of expertise, but may compound it. 
In addition to the compositions of the boards, the tasks undertaken by the 
boards differ in important ways. In the for-profit context, the business judgment 
rule is thought to discourage a judge from second-guessing a complicated business 
deal.286 It is also designed to incentivize innovation and risk-taking, both of which 
                                                          
 
280 Rachel Chiu, 2013 DIRECTOR COMPENSATION REPORT: NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION 
ACROSS INDUSTRIES AND SIZE 1 (2013), available at http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/The_2013_ 
Directors_Compensation_Report.pdf. 
281 See generally Robert D. Herman, Are Public Service Nonprofit Boards Meeting Their 
Responsibilities?, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 387 (2009). 
282 See Chris Cornforth & Charles Edwards, Board Roles in the Strategic Management of Non-Profit 
Organisations: Theory and Practice, 7 CORP. GOV. 346, 360–61 (1999). 
283 See Guo & Musso, supra note 265, at 314–15. 
284 LeRoux, supra note 270, at 512. 
285 Lester M. Salamon, Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government: Toward a 
Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State, 16 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY 
SECTOR Q. 29, 41–42 (1987). 
286 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“Absent an abuse of discretion, [a board’s 
presumptively informed and honest] judgment will be respected by the courts.”); Liebman v. Auto Strop 
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the shareholder has signed on for: after all, that is where gains come from.287 
Moreover, a director’s job is largely limited to oversight from the boardroom.288 
Things are much different on the average nonprofit board. Nonprofit directors 
go well beyond the boardroom and are often called to wear many hats, functioning 
as unpaid staff, as fundraisers, as lobbyists, as well as governors.289 There is also a 
common expectation that nonprofit directors contribute financially to their 
organization—quite the opposite of the custom in the for-profit board.290 Insofar as 
nonprofit board members are asked to wear other hats, their oversight obligations 
tend to be de-emphasized.291 At the same time, when nonprofit boards make 
decisions on simple matters that call for less specialized business knowledge, the 
argument for comparative expertise relative to judges is at its lowest.292 
To conclude, nonprofit directors are expected to do more for the organization 
than simply govern. They are not compensated (and are actually expected to donate 
their own resources to the organization’s cause), they are selected by existing board 
members for reasons other than governing prowess, and they lack clearly-defined 
principals or market discipline. These structural pressures do not push nonprofit 
boards toward good governance, and indeed many scholars are skeptical of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
Co., 150 N.E. 505, 506 (N.Y. 1926) (“Courts will not interfere with [board discretion] unless it be first 
made to appear that the directors have acted or are about to act in bad faith and for a dishonest 
purpose.”). 
287 Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The [business judgment] 
rule could rationally be no different. . . . Shareholders don’t want (or shouldn’t rationally want) directors 
to be risk averse. Shareholders’ investment interests, across the full range of their diversifiable equity 
investments, will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and 
accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are above the firm’s cost of 
capital.”); see also, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 
BUS. LAW. 439, 455–58 (2005) (discussing same). 
288 Katherine O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does the Structure and Composition of the Board Matter? 
The Case of Nonprofit Organizations, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 207 (2005). 
289 Id. at 212. 
290 BOARDSOURCE, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE INDEX 2012: DATA REPORT 1 CEO SURVEY OF 
BOARDSOURCE MEMBERS 16 (2012), available at http://www.thenonprofitpartnership.org/files/board-
source-governance-2012.pdf. 
291 Bradley E. Wright & Judith L. Millesen, Nonprofit Board Role Ambiguity: Investigating Its 
Prevalence, Antecedents, and Consequences, 38 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 322, 334 (2008). 
292 Lee, supra note 125, at 953–54. 
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nonprofit board performance.293 Although quantifying board performance is no 
easy task, nonprofit boards are often thought to fail to live up to even basic “good 
governance” recommendations, such as having board members who attend 
meetings294 or having audit committees with financial experts to ensure the 
organization’s financial integrity.295 As the ALI recently observed: 
[S]ound practices of board constitution and operation in the nonprofit sector 
might be even less prevalent than in the business sector. Indeed, it has long been 
customary in the nonprofit world—in large as well as in small charities—for 
board members to be asked and agree to serve out of friendship with senior 
executives or other board members or out of belief in the charity’s cause, with 
little appreciation of a board member’s role and obligations. Many donation-
dependent organizations have emphasized fundraising above oversight. It has 
seemed acceptable for charities to be governed casually, if not ceremonially, by 
their boards, allowing too much reign to management, particularly when the 
charity’s founder is the chief executive.296 
Application of the business judgment rule when a board lacks business judgment is, 
put simply, a bit of a contradiction in terms. 
                                                          
 
293 Carter G. Bishop, Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A 
Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701, 702 (2008) (“Unfortunately, 
abdication and dereliction are far more common on volunteer nonprofit charitable boards.”); DeMott, 
supra note 10, at 139 (“There is ample reason to believe that the overall quality of directors’ 
performance in the nonprofit sector is less than in publicly-traded, for-profit business corporations.”); 
George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance Without Shareholders: A Cautionary Lesson from Non-
Profit Organizations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 93, 99 (2014); Goldschmid, supra note 2, at 632 (“[A]lmost 
all evidence suggests that nonprofit directors provide less oversight, less effective participation in 
decision-making, and in general, less effective governance than their peers in comparable for-profit 
corporations.”); Barbara E. Taylor et al., The New Work of the Nonprofit Board, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Sept./Oct. 1996, at 4 (“Effective governance by the board of a nonprofit organization is a rare and 
unnatural act.”). 
294 Boyd, supra note 58, at 744; Lee, supra note 125, at 950. Of course, this is not to say that every 
single nonprofit is plagued by the problem of recruiting experts. Our point is simply that, given the 
prevailing practices of board member recruitment, particularly in donative organizations, the deck is 
stacked against nonprofit board expertise. 
295 CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., FINANCIAL LITERACY AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR 31–32 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/files/research/2012 
financialliteracy.pdf. 
296 ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at Part II.3, Introduction, Reporter’s Note (a). 
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The nonprofit’s claim to the same kind of expertise that for-profits have is 
thus often significantly weaker, but this is not the only form of expertise that 
matters. As noted above, nonprofit boards also owe duties of obedience to their 
missions.297 Selecting board members who have a heart, if not a head, for the 
mission likely leads the typical nonprofit board to have more mission expertise than 
good judgment.298 Even here, we remain troubled by the common lack of 
beneficiary influence on the board, leading to boards with strong views on missions 
but less than ideal knowledge about how to best implement them. Moreover, 
fiduciary law operates curiously contrary to this expertise dynamic. As noted 
earlier, the business judgment rule extends deference to duty of care claims, where 
nonprofit boards struggle, while more closely reviewing duty of obedience claims, 
where nonprofit boards have a stronger claim to authority.299 
4. Impact Range 
Although the board’s expertise is measured at the organizational rather than 
the constituent level, the board’s failings can fall unevenly on different 
constituencies. This reality is reflected in the impact range characteristic, which 
measures the potential loss of each type of constituent. 
For the for-profit shareholder, the impact range is decidedly low. Thanks to 
limited liability provisions, a shareholder has no exposure, financial or otherwise, 
beyond the value of his investment.300 Similarly, in most cases, the customer’s only 
exposure or impact is in receiving an unsatisfactory product or service, or in seeing 
a favored product or service discontinued. At best, this is a job for consumer 
                                                          
 
297 See ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at Part II.B.2.c. 
298 See generally BOARDSOURCE, LEADING WITH INTENT: A NATIONAL INDEX OF NONPROFIT BOARD 
PRACTICES (2015), available at http://leadingwithintent.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/LWI-Report-
2.pdf. 
299 See ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at Part II.B. One important exception is that, when required by 
First Amendment concerns, courts have extended great deference to their leaders’ implementation of 
missions. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000) (discussing “expressive association”); 
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (discussing religious 
organizations). 
300 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 91 (1991). This might not have always been precisely true, particularly for closely-held family 
corporations where shareholders have emotional investments as well as financial. Joseph H. Astrachan 
& Peter Jaskiewicz, Emotional Returns and Emotional Costs in Privately Held Family Businesses: 
Advancing Traditional Business Valuation, 21 FAM. BUS. REV. 139, 142 (2008). 
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protection law, and in the broad run of situations, it amounts merely to an 
annoyance. 
Nonprofit donors face a low impact range similar to that of the for-profit 
shareholder. In financial terms, the only real “loss” they can experience is the 
knowledge that their donation was ill-used—assuming, somewhat implausibly for 
most donors, that they take the time to gain actual knowledge on how their 
donation was spent. In contrast to the for-profit shareholder, the donor has no 
expectation of any personal return on his “investment”—the donation. The same 
reasoning holds true for most members, who have invested a membership fee or 
other contribution, but face no additional financial loss. However, with that said, 
the donor and the member very well may feel more loyalty or emotional investment 
in the cause of the particular nonprofit to which he donates than he would upon 
investing in a for-profit corporation. The possible sense of betrayal if a nonprofit 
misuses funds thus should not be disregarded as a constituent impact.301 
Still, anger and disillusion are relatively minor impacts, particularly when 
compared to the impact range faced by interest-linked members. Members of 
homeowners’ associations face the loss of their homes, the forced spending of 
additional money, or the limitations on the use of their private properties.302 
Members of labor unions have the terms of their employment, or even the fact of 
their employment, negotiated and set by the union.303 In both cases, the members 
presumably may derive some benefit from these restrictions—a more pleasant 
neighborhood or a more humane employment contract—but the important point is 
not that the relationship can be a positive one. Of course it can be. It is that the 
relationship has bound up in it so many important rights and interests that an 
institutional failure—the time when it is not a positive relationship—can have 
devastating consequences.304 
Nonprofit staff stand in a similar situation to interest-linked members. 
Economic dependency on a salary places workers at risk of considerable harm if 
                                                          
 
301 The harm is particularly great if the jilted donor spurns charitable giving at large, punishing not just 
the culprit organization but also the sector as a whole. 
302 Pollack, supra note 14, at 869–72. 
303 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012). 
304 Though in the homeowners’ association context, most homeowners’ association residents did not 
seek out the homeowners’ association. Pollack, supra note 14, at 869–70. In some states or industries, 
employees do not have much of a choice when it comes to union membership, either. See Harris v. 
Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
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the salary is discontinued or if working conditions deteriorate due to ineffective 
leadership. 
Finally, we turn to the impact range for customers and beneficiaries. On the 
customer side for both for-profits and nonprofits, the impacts are generally small. 
As discussed in the context of exit, the nonprofit customer may be somewhat more 
limited in his ability to choose a competitor, and so somewhat more impacted by 
mismanagement on the part of the nonprofit, but we continue to treat this as a 
negligible difference.305 However, on the beneficiary side, the impact range can be 
more dramatic. For hungry beneficiaries in need of food and shelter in order to 
survive, the relationship between a nonprofit charity and its beneficiary is almost 
entirely one of reliance.306 Mismanagement or financial misfeasance on the part of 
a nonprofit can result in the intended beneficiaries not receiving the benefits—to 
the same extent, of the same quality, or at all—that are the very purpose of the 
institution and the institutional relationship.307 The potentially large impact on 
nonprofit beneficiaries stands in stark contrast to the impact on many of the other 
stakeholders in the nonprofit’s enterprise. 
5. Homogeneity 
Finally, we examine the homogeneity of the interests of the constituents of the 
institution. As explained above, greater homogeneity diminishes the concerns we 
might have about collective action problems and weak mechanisms of voice 
because it means that “minority interests are less likely to arise.”308 By contrast, an 
institution in which a range of heterogeneous interests must be mediated by the 
leadership is an institution in need of strong mechanisms of accountability to both 
prevent and expose capture or majority domination of minority interests. Put 
another way, we might overlook a non-expert board overseeing a constituency with 
minimal sway in the organization if another constituency can represent their 
                                                          
 
305 See ALI (Draft No. 1), supra note 11, at Part III.B.1. 
306 See Bob Jones, Canton Homeless Shelter Forced to Close Down Due to Lack of Funding, 27 
Residents Must Be Relocated, NEWSNET5 (Jan. 29, 2015, 11:16 AM), http://www.newsnet5.com/news/ 
local-news/oh-stark/canton-homeless-shelter-forced-to-close-down-due-to-lack-of-funding-27-residents-
must-be-relocated. 
307 See Edward Ericson Jr., How Corruption, Waste, and Mismanagement Killed the 143-Year-Old 
Nonprofit and Left Dozens of Baltimoreans Homeless, BOSTON CITY PAPER (Dec. 26, 2012), 
http://www.citypaper.com/bcp-cms-1-1421115-migrated-story-cp-20121226-featu-20121226,0,4820571 
.story. 
308 Gillette, supra note 204, at 1413. 
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interests by proxy. To be clear, because it involves a comparison across 
constituents and not only an analysis of the relationship between a given 
constituent and the institution, this characteristic must be examined at the level of 
the institution, not at the level of each constituent. In this way, it is like the 
expertise metric we have already discussed. 
In the for-profit corporation, the interests of the shareholders are essentially 
unified around maximizing profit. Some shareholders may certainly have 
preferences about how the corporation should be run that go beyond profit, but it is 
a fair generalization that the primary motivation for the average shareholder is the 
return on investment that he hopes to achieve.309 We recognize that the common 
interest of shareholders may not always be shared by customers or employees, who 
naturally may desire to get more from the company and to contribute less, and that 
this divergence may lead to tension between shareholders, customers, and 
employees about how company resources should be allocated. To the extent that 
the for-profit may not be fully homogeneous across all of its constituents, this 
particular metric plays a relatively small role because the for-profit corporation 
scores well on other metrics of accountability. 
The story for nonprofits is similar. At a certain level of generality, everyone 
involved wants the nonprofit to succeed, but there may be differences of 
perspective on how best to achieve success. However, it gets worse because, in the 
context of the nonprofit, there may even be differences of opinion about what 
success entails.310 Recalling the broader mission of nonprofits, the very fact of 
goals unrelated to profit opens the door to these kinds of heterogeneous 
perspectives. Donors are often looked to as a stand-in for beneficiaries within the 
organization, and while donors and beneficiaries want the organization to spend its 
resources both wisely and effectively, potential differences quickly emerge 
between and among donors and beneficiaries.311 
To begin, as noted in the prior section, the actual harm faced by a donor is 
nowhere near as deep or concrete as the threat to the beneficiary. This means that 
the donor lacks a strong incentive to monitor and uncover mismanagement. Even if 
the donor were so inclined, effective monitoring is costly because the harms are 
                                                          
 
309 Pollack, supra note 14, at 872. 
310 See generally John C. Sawhill & David Williamson, Mission Impossible? Measuring Success in 
Nonprofit Organizations, 11 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 371 (2001). 
311 Ebrahim, supra note 17, at 198. 
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experienced more by someone unconnected to the donor.312 By contrast, whereas a 
donor may not care all that much about exactly how the nonprofit goes about 
achieving the ends for which the donor donated, and whereas a donor may be 
indifferent about the kinds of tradeoffs that may need to be made in the course of 
providing services or benefits, a beneficiary may have substantial preferences and 
may feel the costs of a “wrong” choice far more acutely than would a donor. 
However, beyond diverging incentives and information lies a more fundamental 
incongruence of perspectives between donor and beneficiary. Donors often come 
from a much different place than the clients served, and as a result may have little 
understanding of what beneficiaries truly need.313 Employees come closest to 
representing the beneficiary—their relatively close interactions with the beneficiary 
give them the best insight—but employees have incentives for better salaries, 
offices, and working conditions that regularly put their interests in conflict with 
those of the clients.314 
Given the significant problems with beneficiaries’ access to the other levers 
of accountability discussed here, we would want to see a very clear signal of 
interest homogeneity before accepting a weak judicial role—one that we do not 
have. 
C. Summary 
This analysis reveals that, when it comes to accountability factors relevant to 
a system of judicial review, nonprofit organizations share many similarities with 
for-profit organizations. This suggests that the relatively unthinking, yet nearly 
wholesale, adoption by nonprofit law of for-profit law’s fiduciary doctrines 
actually can be justified based on the sort of institutional analysis we have set out 
here. However, while it is encouraging that nonprofit law is largely on the right 
track by using for-profit corporate law as its baseline, there are a few notable 
departures in the nonprofit realm that warrant closer examination. 
                                                          
 
312 Manne, supra note 92, at 257–58. 
313 Indeed, those who control the purse strings may overestimate their knowledge, creating an additional 
barrier to the needs of those they serve. Cf. Dennis R. Young, The Influence of Business on Nonprofit 
Organizations and the Complexity of Nonprofit Accountability: Looking Inside as Well as Outside, 32 
AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 3, 5 (2002) (noting that board members can “bring strong ideas but limited 
understanding of the organization’s societal mission or purpose or how that purpose can be effectively 
achieved”). 
314 No doubt, many employees will be able to suppress their own incentives for the good of those of the 
organization. However, this possibility does not change the fact that the conflicting interests make them 
a poor stand-in for beneficiaries. 
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First, while many constituencies of nonprofit organizations can, for the most 
part, keep the organization on the right track (from their perspective, at least) 
through available means of voice and exit, there is considerable variation between 
the different constituencies in their ability to provide internal accountability. Figure 
3, below, illustrates how nonprofit and for-profit constituencies tend to compare in 
terms of exit and voice, as well as the potential impact range. For-profit 
shareholders and nonprofit members enjoy the most exit and voice, but nonprofit 
donors have ample opportunities for exit that also work to keep the nonprofit 
organization in check. Of course, these internal mechanisms of accountability are 
not perfect. For example, the incentives for closely monitoring nonprofit behavior 
are generally thought to be lower in the nonprofit world than in business 
enterprises, as the financial motive of reaping maximum profits leads to greater 
oversight.315 However, for the most part, exit and voice provide powerful forms of 
institutional accountability for most constituencies in both the for-profit and 
nonprofit realms. 
The general utility of exit and voice is a good thing for defenders of the 
judicial treatment of nonprofits because nonprofits are not generally characterized 
by well-functioning governing boards with considerable expertise. As noted, the 
commentary on nonprofit boards is sharply critical. Recall that board expertise is a 
primary justification for keeping government and courts in a relatively hands-off 
posture of organizational decision-making, but on this metric, nonprofits perform 
quite poorly as a general rule. 
But what about those constituents for whom exit and voice are less clearly 
effective? Because of the failure of expertise at the institutional level, we are 
troubled by the fact that the points with the least exit and voice—beneficiaries and 
interest-linked members—are also the largest. These constituents face the biggest 
impact ranges, whereas the points with the most exit and voice are also the 
smallest. Interest-linked members are in a relatively better position than 
beneficiaries, but that is only because of the promise of voice. Where voice is 
effective, a deferential judicial posture is well-justified, but if it is not or cannot be 
made effective, courts should be prepared to “fill the breach.” However, for 
beneficiaries, neither exit nor voice has much promise. Beneficiaries of the 
nonprofit tend to have little sway within the organization, both compared to other 
nonprofit constituencies and compared to all for-profit constituencies. Moreover, 
our institutional analysis reveals a striking disparity between beneficiary influence 
                                                          
 
315 Manne, supra note 92, at 257–58. 
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on the organization and impact on the beneficiary. Since beneficiaries often depend 
on nonprofits for food, housing, and medical care, they have a tremendous amount 
at stake when a nonprofit loses its way. Neither the board nor any other 
constituency faces this loss in quite the same way as the beneficiary, leaving the 
beneficiary class at the greatest risk of harm from governing errors. 
Figure 3. Results of Institutional Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
As is too often the case, the current legal regime in which nonprofits operate 
and make decisions arose out of inertia and analogies that do not, at first glance, go 
beyond the surface. By looking carefully at the mechanisms of accountability that 
operate within the for-profit and the nonprofit, and by examining the strength of the 
claims to those mechanisms possessed by those institutions’ various constituencies, 
we have tested the validity of these analogies and concluded that, in fact, the 
nonprofit and the for-profit are generally similar in this regard. For most of the 
relevant constituencies, the corporate law analogy is one that is far more justified 
than has previously been recognized. 
However, we caution that the analogy—and the legal regime it entails—
comes up short when we consider interest-linked members and beneficiaries. 
Whereas extralegal mechanisms of accountability keep the organization’s leaders 
on track with respect to many constituencies, institutional characteristics conspire 
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with legal rules to place these groups in a relatively powerless posture. Thus, there 
is a real risk of disconnect between those who run charitable organizations and 
those who should be benefiting from them. Hoping for good behavior from those in 
charge is not enough. Even if nonprofit governors mean well, they may not be 
doing well—at least not as well as they could. By prioritizing deference to 
nonprofit directors over the needs of the vulnerable, fiduciary law substitutes 
motive for duty and good intentions for good acts. 
At a minimum, this finding warrants further examination. Generic calls for 
sector accountability through increased federal or state regulation316 or vesting 
fiduciary enforcement in specially incentivized third parties317 might address some 
issues facing the sector, but they still leave the beneficiary voiceless and the 
interest-linked member immobile. Given that the blind spot with respect to these 
constituencies is largely a product of failings of voice and exit, we see potential in 
reforms specifically targeted at increasing their voice. Although one approach 
might be to increase standing318 or to decrease the legal rights of those with greater 
economic sway,319 a promising option with respect to beneficiaries could be to 
provide them with a formal voice outside of litigation. For example, charities might 
be required, perhaps as a condition of receiving federal or state tax exempt status, 
to have a certain percentage of the board composed of beneficiary 
representatives.320 Many government funding programs already require the served 
population to have representation on the board.321 Alternatively, nonprofits could 
be required to grant beneficiaries a vote on at least some director candidates and 
major organizational decisions, such as modification to the articles of 
                                                          
 
316 See Mead, supra note 9; Boyd, supra note 58. 
317 See James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 272–87 (2003) 
(proposing a charity commission); Fishman, supra note 64, at 671–74 (proposing increased use of 
relators); Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through a 
Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 68–81 (2009) (proposing a federal 
oversight board); Manne, supra note 92 (proposing for-profit monitoring companies). 
318 Goldschmid, supra note 2, at 670; Nix, supra note 8, at 188. 
319 Given the greater influence of donors compared to beneficiaries within the organization, we should 
be wary about extending additional legal rights to donors, such as granting them standing or allowing 
them to enforce restrictions on gifts. 
320 Obviously, some nonprofits’ beneficiaries, e.g., young children, will be unable to serve as board 
members, creating the need for a representative closely aligned with their interest, e.g., parents. 
321 LeRoux, supra note 270, at 512. 
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incorporation, thus creating a class of beneficiary members.322 If election mandates 
are viewed as too blunt, courts could instead tailor the level of deference extended 
to a decision to the level of input the organization received from beneficiaries 
before acting. Solutions that focus on the level of deference courts extend, and the 
preconditions for that deference, could also be worthwhile in the context of 
interest-linked members for whom formal avenues for voice may fail to live up to 
their promise.323 
Holding the leaders of donative organizations to their charitable goals is not 
something that the law can do alone. Nonprofits should take seriously their 
obligations to all their constituencies, not just in marketing materials, but also by 
including them in the organization’s decision-making. 
                                                          
 
322 Reiser, supra note 39, at 850–52. These election rights could come with more complex director 
election rules that allow a mix of elected and appointed directors on a single board, or different classes 
of membership with different voting rights, much as we might find with different stock classes. 
323 See generally Pollack, supra note 14. 
